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9.37.1 Agreements on POW Release and Repatriation. The release and repatriation ofPOWs generally have been addressed by peace treaties or other agreements among belligerentsat the end of the war. 879 For example, agreements may address the apportionment of costs orcommissions to search for dispersed POWs. 880In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between theparties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement,each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan ofrepatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in paragraph 1 of the Article 118 of theGPW. 881 Thus, once active hostilities have ceased, the Detaining Powers must release andrepatriate POWs, even if there is no specific agreement regarding the release and repatriation ofPOWs, or even if a formal peace agreement ending the war has not yet been concluded. 882During the process of releasing and repatriating POWs, it is proper to expect that eachparty’s conduct with respect to the repatriation of POWs will be reasonable and broadlycommensurate with the conduct of the other. 883 For example, it would not be reasonable to879 For example, FINAL REPORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 586 (“In March [of 1991], Coalition forces and Iraqsigned a memorandum of understanding detailing administrative procedures for the repatriation of the remainingEPW, under ICRC auspices. On 4 March, Iraq released the first group of 10 Coalition POWs, six of whom wereAmerican. On 6 March, the US reciprocated by releasing 294 EPWs to the ICRC for repatriation to Iraq.”);Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the SupremeCommander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the otherhand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea art. 51, Jul. 27, 1953, 29 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 132,137 (Aug. 3, 1953) (“The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the timethis armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreedupon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.”).880 Refer to § 9.37.6 (Costs of Repatriation at the Close of Hostilities); § 9.37.5 (Commissions to Search forDispersed POWs).881 GPW art. 118 (“In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Partiesto the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powersshall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down inthe foregoing paragraph.”).882 LAUTERPACHT, II OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 613 (§275) (“That provision [of Article 118 of the GPW]was inspired by the experience of the situation as it developed after the Second World War when, following uponthe unconditional surrender of Italy, Germany, and Japan, no treaty of peace was concluded between the principalbelligerents for some years and when public opinion in many countries viewed with disapproval the continueddetention of prisoners of war at a time when there was no longer any reasonable possibility that hostilities might beresumed.”).883 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Prisoners of War, Eritrea’s Claim 17, 149 (Jul. 1, 2003)(“The Commission finds that, given the character of the repatriation obligation and state practice, it is appropriate toconsider the behavior of both Parties in assessing whether or when Ethiopia failed to meet its obligations underArticle 118. In the Commission’s view, Article 118 does not require precisely equivalent behavior by each Party.However, it is proper to expect that each Party’s conduct with respect to the repatriation of POWs will be reasonableand broadly commensurate with the conduct of the other. Moreover, both Parties must continue to strive to ensurecompliance with the basic objective of Article 118 – the release and repatriation of POWs as promptly as possiblefollowing the cessation of active hostilities. Neither Party may unilaterally abandon the release and repatriationprocess or refuse to work in good faith with the ICRC to resolve any impediments.”).633