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military importance are located and to place additional restrictions on attacks conducted outsidethese areas in order to limit unnecessary destruction. 3015.11.5 AP I Provision on Choice Possible Between Several Military Objectives. AP Iprovides that “[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining asimilar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may beexpected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.” 302 The United Stateshas expressed the view that this rule is not a requirement of customary international law. 3035.12 PROPORTIONALITY IN CONDUCTING ATTACKSCombatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury tocivilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relationto the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 304 This is commonly calledthe proportionality rule.approving the strike must determine that no civilians are present. If unable to assess the risk of civilian presence,fires are prohibited, except under of the following two conditions (specific conditions deleted due to operationalsecurity; however, they have to do with the risk to ISAF and Afghan forces). (NOTE) This directive, as with theprevious version, does not prevent commanders from protecting the lives of their men and women as a matter ofself-defense where it is determined no other options are available to effectively counter the threat.).”); U.S.MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIET-NAM DIRECTIVE 525-13, Military Operations: Rules of Engagement for theEmployment of Firepower in the Republic of Vietnam, 5g (May 1971), reprinted in 1975 DIGEST OF UNITEDSTATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 814, 815 (“Specified Strike Zones (SSZ). An area designated for aspecific period of time by Government of South Viet-Nam (G.V.N.) RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces]in which there are no friendly forces or populace and in which targets may be attacked on the initiative ofU.S./FWMAF/RVNAF commanders. SSZ will not be referred to as ‘Free Fire Zones.’ Furthermore, the term ‘FreeFire Zone’ will not be used under any circumstances.”).301 For example, MALCOLM W. CAGLE & FRANK A. MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 97 (1957) (“Vice AdmiralStruble’s orders to the bombardment forces clearly specified that there should be no promiscuous firing at the cityitself or at civilian installations. To achieve this, the entire objective area had been divided into 60 sub-areas.Known military targets had been previously assigned, and those which offered the greatest potential hazard to ourlanding troops were circled in red. It had been agreed that any ship could fire into a red-circle area with or without a‘spot.’ In the uncircled areas, however, firing was permitted only if definite targets were found and an air spot wasavailable. This differentiation between types of areas was adopted to reduce destruction of nonmilitary targets to aminimum, to save the city of Inchon for occupation forces, and to avoid injury to civilian personnel. ‘The Seoul-Inchon area is inhabited by our South Korean Allies,’ said Struble in an order to his forces, ‘and our forces plan toutilize facilities in this area. Unnecessary destruction will impede our progress. Bombing and gunfire will beconfined to targets whose destruction will contribute to the conduct of operations – accurate gunfire and pinpointbombing against specific targets, rather than area destruction, is contemplated.”).302 AP I art. 57(3).303 U.S. Comments on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Memorandum on the Applicability ofInternational Humanitarian Law in the Gulf Region, Jan. 11, 1991, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 1991-1999 2057, 2064 (“Paragraph 4B(4) contains the language of Article 57(3) of Protocol I,and is not a part of customary law. The provision applies ‘when a choice is possible … ;’ it is not mandatory. Anattacker may comply with it if it is possible to do so, subject to mission accomplishment and allowable risk, or hemay determine that it is impossible to make such a determination.”) (amendment shown in Digest).304 1956 FM 27-10 (Change No. 1 1976) 41 (“loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not beexcessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Those who plan or decideupon an attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to ensure not only that the objectives are identified as241