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applicable to all weapons would apply to weapons with autonomous functions. For example,autonomous weapon systems must not be calculated to cause superfluous injury or be inherentlyindiscriminate. 1046.5.9.3 Law of War Obligations of Distinction and Proportionality Apply toPersons Rather Than the Weapons Themselves. The law of war rules on conducting attacks(such as the rules relating to discrimination and proportionality) impose obligations on persons.These rules do not impose obligations on the weapons themselves; of course, an inanimate objectcould not assume an “obligation” in any event. Thus, it is not the case that the law of warrequires that a weapon determine whether its target is a military objective. Similarly, the law ofwar does not require that a weapon make other legal determinations such as whether an attackmay be expected to result in incidental harm that is excessive in relation to the concrete anddirect military advantage expected to be gained. The law of war does not require weapons tomake legal determinations, even if the weapon (e.g., through computers, software, and sensors)may be characterized as capable of making factual determinations, such as whether to fire theweapon or to select and engage a target. Rudimentary autonomous weapons, such as mines,have been employed for many years, and there has never been a requirement that such weaponsthemselves determine that legal requirements are met.Rather, it is persons who must comply with the law of war. For example, persons maynot use inherently indiscriminate weapons. 105 In addition, in the situation in which a person isusing a weapon that selects and engages targets autonomously, that person must refrain fromusing that weapon where it is expected to result in incidental harm that is excessive in relation tothe concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 106 In addition, the obligationon the person using the weapon to take feasible precautions in order to reduce the risk of civiliancasualties may be more significant when the person uses weapon systems with moresophisticated autonomous functions. 107 For example, such feasible precautions a person isobligated to take may include monitoring the operation of the weapon system or programming orbuilding mechanisms for the weapon to deactivate automatically after a certain period of time.6.5.9.4 DoD Policy on Autonomy in Weapon Systems. DoD policy has addressedthe use of autonomy in certain types of weapon systems. 108 Under a 2012 policy, certain typesof autonomous weapon systems require an additional review by senior DoD officials beforeformal development and fielding. 109 In addition, the policy establishes rigorous standards for104 Refer to § 6.6 (Weapons Calculated to Cause Superfluous Injury); § 6.7 (Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons).105 Refer to § 6.7 (Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons).106 Refer to § 5.12 (Proportionality in Conducting Attacks).107 Refer to § 5.11 (Feasible Precautions in Conducting Attacks to Reduce the Risk of Harm to Protected Persons andObjects).108 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems (Nov. 21, 2012).109 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, 4d (Nov. 21, 2012) (“Autonomous or semiautonomousweapon systems intended to be used in a manner that falls outside the policies in subparagraphs 4.c.(1)through 4.c.(3) must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)); the Under Secretary ofDefense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); and the CJCS before formal development andagain before fielding in accordance with the guidelines in Enclosure 3, References (b) and (c), and other applicablepolicies and issuances.”).330

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