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1.8.2.3 Specially Affected States. The practice of “States whose interests arespecially affected,” e.g., States with a distinctive history of participation in the relevant matter,must support the purported rule. 140 States that have had a wealth of experience, or that haveotherwise had significant opportunities to develop a carefully considered military doctrine, maybe expected to have contributed a greater quantity and quality of State practice relevant to thelaw of war than States that have not.For example, “specially affected States” could include, depending upon the relevantmatter, the nuclear powers, other major military powers, and occupying or occupied States. 141As a case in point, the United Kingdom has been viewed as a specially affected State withrespect to the law of the sea. 1421.8.2.4 Contrary Practice. Evidence of contrary practice, i.e., the practice ofStates that does not support the purported rule, must be considered in assessing whether that ruleexists as a rule of customary international law. 143on non-binding resolutions of the General Assembly, given that States may lend their support to a particularresolution, or determine not to break consensus in regard to such a resolution, for reasons having nothing to do witha belief that the propositions in it reflect customary international law.”).140 See U.S. RESPONSE TO ICRC CIHL STUDY 517 endnote 3 (“Not every State that has participated in an armedconflict is ‘specially affected;’ such States do generate salient practice, but it is those States that have a distinctivehistory of participation that merit being regarded as ‘specially affected.’”); Written Statement of the Government ofthe United States of America, 28-29, Jun. 20, 1995, I.C.J., Request by the United Nations General Assembly for anAdvisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (“Evidence of a customary normrequires indication of ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ State practice, including States whose interests are ‘speciallyaffected.’ … With respect to the use of nuclear weapons, customary law could not be created over the objection ofthe nuclear-weapon States, which are the States whose interests are most specially affected.”).141 Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AJIL238, 249 (1996) (“A broader question, however, concerns the degree of weight to be assigned to the practice ofvarious states in the formation of the international customary law of war. I find it difficult to accept the view,sometimes advanced, that all states, whatever their geographical situation, military power and interests, inter alia,have an equal role in this regard. Belligerency is only one factor here. The practice and opinion of Switzerland, forexample, as a neutral state, surely have more to teach us about assessment of customary neutrality law than thepractice of states that are not committed to the policy of neutrality and have not engaged in pertinent nationalpractice. The practice of ‘specially affected states’ -such as nuclear powers, other major military powers, andoccupying and occupied states-which have a track record of statements, practice and policy, remains particularlytelling. I do not mean to denigrate state equality, but simply to recognize the greater involvement of some states inthe development of the law of war, not only through operational practice but through policies expressed, forexample, in military manuals.”).142 See, e g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 719 (1900) (Fuller, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]t is difficult toconceive of a law of the sea of universal obligation to which Great Britain has not acceded.”).143 For example, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 311, 311-12(Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel) (“One way of surmounting the antinomy between practice andprinciple would be to put aside practice. That is what those who maintain that the threat or use of nuclear weaponsis unlawful in all circumstances do. … State practice demonstrates that nuclear weapons have been manufacturedand deployed by States for some 50 years; that in that deployment inheres a threat of possible use; and that theinternational community, by treaty and through action of the United Nations Security Council, has, far fromproscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances, recognized in effect or in terms that in certaincircumstances nuclear weapons may be used or their use threatened.”).32