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17.16.1 Display of the Emblem Under the Direction of the Competent AuthorityConcerned. The display of the distinctive emblem is under the direction of the competentauthority concerned, which authority may authorize the removal or obscuring of the distinctiveemblem for tactical purposes, such as camouflage. 197 Similarly, it would be appropriate for thedistinctive emblem to be removed if it is assessed that enemy forces will fail to respect theemblem and seek to attack medical personnel; display of the emblem in such circumstanceswould be deemed not to be feasible. 19817.16.2 Improper Use of the Distinctive Emblem. Improper use of the distinctiveemblem includes use: (1) while engaging in attacks; (2) in order to shield, favor, or protect one’sown military operations; or (3) to impede enemy military operations. 19917.17 DETENTION IN NIAC17.17.1 State Authority to Detain. Law of war treaties have not limited the scope ofwhom a State may detain for reasons related to a non-international armed conflict, but haveprescribed humane treatment for such persons. 200 A State’s authority to conduct detentionoperations has often been understood as incident to the legal basis of the State to engage inoperations against the non-State armed group. 201The precise legal requirements for a detention regime established by a State in noninternationalarmed conflict would likely depend a great deal on its domestic law.17.17.1.1 Non-Punitive Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict. Nonpunitivedetention may be conducted on a variety of legal theories under international law. 202For example, although enemy non-State armed groups would not be entitled to POW status, aState may detain persons belonging to enemy armed groups, by analogy to the detention ofPOWs in international armed conflict. Similarly, although persons would not be protectedpersons under the GC, a State may detain persons for security reasons, by analogy to the197 Compare § 7.15.2.1 (Removal or Obscuration of the Distinctive Emblem).198 Refer to § 5.3.3.2 (What Precautions Are Feasible).199 Refer to § 5.24 (Improper Use of Certain Signs).200 AP II art. 5(1) (“In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be respected as aminimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they areinterned or detained:”).201 Refer to § 8.1.3.1 (Detention Authority).202 For example, FRANK KITSON, GANGS AND COUNTER-GANGS 45 (1960) (“There was one other legal means ofgetting at the Mau Mau. This was for the Police to submit a dossier giving a full list of all that was known against aperson to the Governor, who could then sign an order for detention during the Emergency providing he was satisfiedthat such action was necessary in the interests of maintaining public order. This was a good idea as far as it went butthe Governor could only sign a comparatively limited number. Certainly the system could not take care of all thecommittee members of all the committees though it was satisfactory for the most senior ones. It was an advance inanother way, in that it all but recognized the status of prisoner of war by saying to a man ‘You are not a criminal butyou are on the wrong side. You must be restrained until this trouble is over.’ It was of course contrary to theprinciples of British justice but it was merciful. In its extended form later in the Emergency it saved thousands ofloyalist lives by reducing the number of Mau Mau, and probably saved many Mau Mau lives by locking up peoplewho would otherwise have joined the gangs and been killed by the Security Forces.”).1046