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with a view towards weakening them and diverting their resources. 610 Enemy forces, for thepurpose of this rule, means those persons constituting military objectives. 611Starvation specifically directed against the enemy civilian population, however, isprohibited. 612 For example, it would be prohibited to destroy food or water supplies for thepurpose of denying sustenance to the civilian population.5.20.2 Starvation – Proportionality. Military action intended to starve enemy forces,however, must not be taken where it is expected to result in incidental harm to the civilianpopulation that is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated to be gained. 613Feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population or otherreasonable measures to mitigate the burden to the civilian population may also be warrantedwhen seeking to starve enemy forces. 614 For example, it may be appropriate to seek tocompensate civilians whose food has been inadvertently destroyed. 615 Moreover, an Occupying610 For example, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Directorate of Operations Analysis,Project CHECO [Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations] Report, “Ranch Hand: HerbicideOperations in SEA [Southeast Asia]” 19 (Jul. 13, 1971) (“The enemy documents revealed that the VC [Viet Cong]had suffered serious personnel losses due to the lack of food. Troops normally used in fighting had to be detailed tocrop raising, and in one case the 95th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment had to fast for one or two days onseveral occasions due to a lack of food. The overall conclusion of the PACOM report was that crop destruction was‘an integral, essential and effective part of the total effort in South Vietnam.’”).611 Refer to § 5.7.2 (Persons Who Are Military Objectives).612 See J. Fred Buzhardt, DoD General Counsel, Letter to Chairman Fulbright, Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, Apr. 5, 1971, 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1300, 1302 (1971) (“But an attack by any meansagainst crops intended solely for consumption by noncombatants not contributing to the enemy’s war effort wouldbe unlawful for such would not be an attack upon a legitimate military objective.”). Consider AP I art. 54(1)(“Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.”).613 Cf. J. Fred Buzhardt, DoD General Counsel, Letter to Chairman Fulbright, Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, Apr. 5, 1971, 10 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1300, 1302 (1971) (“Where it cannot be determinedwhether crops were intended solely for consumption by the enemy’s armed forces, crop destruction would be lawfulif a reasonable inquiry indicated that the intended destruction is justified by military necessity under the principles ofHague Regulation Article 23(g), and that the devastation occasioned is not disproportionate to the militaryadvantage gained.”).614 Refer to § 5.3.3 (Affirmative Duties to Take Feasible Precautions for the Protection of Civilians and OtherProtected Persons and Objects).615 For example, Department of State, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam,Washington, May 7, 1963, reprinted in III FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VIETNAM,JANUARY–AUGUST 1963, DOCUMENT 110, p. 275 (“All herbicide operations [including crop destruction] to beundertaken only after it is clear both PsyWar preparations and compensation and relief machinery [for peasantswhose crops are inadvertently destroyed] are adequate. Would appear GVN [Government of Vietnam] shouldincrease compensation efforts.”); Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Chemical Defoliation andCrop Destruction in South Viet-Nam, Washington, Apr. 18, 1963, reprinted in III FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THEUNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VIETNAM, JANUARY–AUGUST 1963, DOCUMENT 96, pp. 240 (“The GVN [Governmentof Vietnam] has set up a mechanism for compensating peasants whose crops are inadvertently destroyed. We do nothave much information on the results of the compensation program, but there are indications that it was notadequately carried out, in part because of security difficulties.”).292