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ecause the armed group failed to satisfy the conditions. 145 Similarly, isolated departures from acondition by a member of the armed group (e.g., a failure to comply with the conditions by amember of the armed group that was not directed by the armed group’s leader) would notprevent the armed group from satisfying these conditions.4.6.1.2 AP I and the GPW 4A(2) Conditions. AP I changed, for its Parties, theconditions under which armed groups that are not part of a State’s armed forces may qualify forcombatant status. 146 The United States has objected to the way these changes relaxed therequirements for obtaining the privileges of combatant status, and did not ratify AP I, in largepart, because of them. 147 A chief concern has been the extent to which these changes wouldundermine the protection of the civilian population. 148 The United States has expressed the viewthat it would not be appropriate to treat this provision of AP I as customary international law. 149145 See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 45 BRITISH YEAR BOOKOF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 197 (1971) (“the fate of the individual irregular is essentially linked with that of thegroup in which he operates. If the group’s members, as a majority, always meet the legal conditions, the individualwill answer only for his own misdoings, and then as a prisoner of war who had the right to participate in the combat.If, however, the individual were punctilious in a group in which the majority did not observe the conditions on anyone occasion, he would not acquire combatant status or prisoner-of-war status upon capture, and will answer in lawas an individual who participated in combat with no legal right to do so, i.e. answerable in municipal law oroccupation law, or the law of war.”).146 See AP I, arts. 1(4), 43, 44.147 See Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal, Jan. 29, 1987, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING AP II IV(“Another provision [of AP I] would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy thetraditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the lawsof war. This would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal themselves.”).148 See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III, Lawyers and Wars: A Symposium in Honor of Edward R. Cummings, Sept. 30,2005, 2005 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 953, 955 (“More problematic from thelawyer’s perspective—or at least this lawyer’s perspective—is how law deals with the kind of situation where awould-be terrorist seeks to cloak his actions in the garb of legitimate combatant. This second factor working againstcivilian protection is fueled in part by Article 44 of Additional Protocol I, which suggests that combatants do notneed to distinguish themselves from the civilian population except prior to and during an attack. To be fair, there isno doubt that a terrorist would not meet the combatancy definition of any instrument of international humanitarianlaw. But the very fact that Additional Protocol I allows greater flexibility in distinction undermines thisfundamental protection. The principle of distinction, among the foundational principles of humanitarian law, existsfor the purposes of civilian protection, to ensure that fighters can identify the combatant from the bystander. Article44, pressed so strongly for largely political reasons in the 1970s, undermines it. And as a result, one has to lamentthat the process of negotiating international humanitarian law instruments has not always inured to the civilianpopulation’s benefit.”).149 Memorandum submitted in United States v. Shakur, 690 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), III CUMULATIVEDIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-88 3436, 3441 (“Article 44 grants combatantstatus to irregular forces in certain circumstances even if they do not satisfy the traditional requirements todistinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply with the existing laws of war. This wasnot acceptable as a new norm of international law. It clearly does not reflect customary law. … While the U.S. is ofthe view that certain provisions in Protocol I reflect customary international law (see, e.g., Treaty Doc. 100-2, supra,at X), the provisions on wars of national liberation and combatant and prisoner-of-war status are definitely not inthis category. … Accordingly, it is the view of the United States that it would be inappropriate to treat theseprovisions as part of customary international law under any circumstances.”).120