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are nationals of that State could be required to serve in that State’s armed forces or to take part inoperations directed against their former comrades. 15317.12.2 Methods of Gaining Cooperation. Inhumane treatment or other illegal methods(such as threats to commit unlawful acts) may not be used to gain the cooperation of capturedenemy persons. 154However, a combination of threats of criminal punishment and inducements (e.g.,amnesty, monetary rewards) may be used to seek to gain the cooperation of captured enemypersons. 155 For example, law enforcement authorities often use the cooperation of members ofcriminal gangs or conspiracies to thwart and to prosecute the other participants or leaders in thatcriminal enterprise. 156153 For example, Donald A. MacCuish and Spencer C. Tucker, Pseudoforces, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCYAND COUNTERINSURGENCY: A NEW ERA OF MODERN WARFARE 452 (2013) (“Pseudoforces are military units madeup of former insurgents who have been turned to work with counterinsurgency forces against their formercolleagues. This is possible because insurgent rank and filers are generally not as committed as their ideologicallybound leaders. Pseudoforces are a tremendous advantage in counterinsurgency operations. They can identifycertain of the insurgents, are well familiar with the operational terrain and the villagers, and understand whatmotivates the insurgents and their supporters. They are of immense importance. Pseudoforces have played a role invirtually every insurgency since World War II (1939-1945). … During the Dhofar campaigns in Oman (1970-1975),the British made extensive use of pseudoforces, employing some 1,600 in 21 different units based on tribalaffiliations. The Portuguese also made extensive use of pseudoforces during the insurgencies in their Africanterritories. Notable among these were the Flechas (‘Arrows’) in Angola.”); MAJOR LAWRENCE M. GREENBERG, THEHUKBALAHAP INSURRECTION: A CASE STUDY OF A SUCCESSFUL ANTI-INSURGENCY OPERATION IN THE PHILIPPINES– 1946-1955 125 (1986) (“On the island of Panay, the Philippine Army tried a variation of the ‘Force X’ concept tobreak the local guerrilla structure. Accompanied by three military intelligence agents, a group of twenty formerHuks were infiltrated into the island’s interior. After three months of gathering information, establishing their coveras a bona fide Huk unit, and gaining the confidence of the island’s Huk leadership, they hosted a ‘by invitation only’barbecue for the Panay High Command. Between the ribs and potato salad, the covert government force sprang anambush that killed or captured nearly all the Panay commanders and crippled the organization on the island for theduration of the campaign.”).154 Refer to § 8.2 (Humane Treatment of Detainees); § 8.2.4 (Threats to Commit Inhumane Treatment).155 For example, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-19 (1-104) (Dec. 2006)(“Nothing is more demoralizing to insurgents than realizing that people inside their movement or trusted supportersamong the public are deserting or providing information to government authorities. Counterinsurgents may attractdeserters or informants by arousing fear of prosecution or by offering rewards.”).156 For example, Benjamin Weiser, Terrorist Has Cooperated With U.S. Since Secret Guilty Plea in 2011, PapersShow, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013 (“A Somali terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda whose capture andinterrogation aboard a United States naval ship in 2011 fueled debate about the Obama administration’scounterterrorism tactics secretly pleaded guilty in Manhattan and has been cooperating with the authorities, courtdocuments released on Monday show. The terrorist, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, served as a military commanderwith the Shabab in Somalia and worked as a liaison with Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, including brokering a dealfor the Shabab to buy weapons directly from the Qaeda group, the government has said. The newly unsealed courtpapers show Mr. Warsame pleaded guilty in a closed court proceeding in Manhattan in December 2011, about fivemonths after he was brought to New York. After the plea, he met weekly with the government for hours at a time,disclosing intelligence information about his Shabab and Qaeda co-conspirators, who included ‘high-levelinternational terrorist operatives,’ prosecutors said in one highly redacted letter dated March 2012.”).1040