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“Military advantage” refers to the advantage anticipated from an attack when consideredas a whole, and not only from its isolated or particular parts. 169 Similarly, “military advantage”is not restricted to immediate tactical gains, but may be assessed in the full context of the warstrategy. 170The definite military advantage offered by damaging, destroying, or neutralizing theobject may result from denying the enemy the ability to use this object in its military operations(i.e., to benefit from the object’s effective contribution to the military action). For example, theattack or seizure of objects with a common military purpose, such as bridges used, or potentiallyavailable to be used, in lines of communication would offer a definite military advantage.The military advantage from an attack is broader than only denying the enemy the benefitof that object’s contribution to its military action. For example, in a diversionary attack, themilitary advantage to be gained from attacking an object would result from diverting the enemy’sresources and attention. 171 The military advantage from an attack may involve a variety of otherconsiderations, including improving the security of the attacking force.The military advantage from an attack may result from harm to the morale of enemyforces. 172 Diminishing the morale of the civilian population and their support for the war effortdoes not provide a definite military advantage. 173 However, attacks that are otherwise lawful arenot rendered unlawful if they happen to result in diminished civilian morale. 174169 See, e.g., France, Statement on Ratification of AP I, translated in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMEDCONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 800 (2004) (“It is theunderstanding of the Government of the French Republic that the expression ‘military advantage’ contained inparagraphs 5(b) of Article 51, 2 of Article 52 and 2(a)(iii) of Article 57, is intended to refer to the advantageanticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the attack.”); Spain,Statement on Ratification of AP I, Apr. 21, 1989, 1537 UNTS 389, 392 (“Articles 51, 52 and 57. It is understoodthat the words ‘military advantage’ in these articles refer to the advantage expected from the attack as a whole andnot from isolated parts of it.”).170 See FINAL REPORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 613 (“‘Military advantage’ is not restricted to tactical gains, butis linked to the full context of a war strategy, in this instance, the execution of the Coalition war plan for liberationof Kuwait.”).171 For example, BOTHE, PARTSCH, & SOLF, NEW RULES 325 (AP I art. 52, 2.4.4) (“Thus, prior to the 1944 crosschannel operation, the Allies attacked a large number of bridges, fuel dumps, airfields and other targets in the Pas deCalais. These targets made an effective contribution to German military action in that area. The primary militaryadvantage of these attacks anticipated by the Allies, however, was not to reduce German military strength in thatarea, but to deceive the Germans into believing that the Allied amphibious assault would occur in the Pas de Calaisinstead of the beaches of Normandy.”); MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION, THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBINGSURVEY (PACIFIC): JAPANESE AIR POWER 10 (1946) (“The [Doolittle] raid was too small to do substantial physicaldamage, but its repercussions on the planning level of the high command were considerable. ... [A]ttention wasfocused on the eastern approaches to the home islands, and additional impetus given the prewar plan to attackMidway and the Aleutians. ... [T]he Japanese began to implement their plans for air defense of Japan which beforethat time had received scant consideration. ... A total of four Army fighter groups were held in Japan throughout1942 and 1943 for the defense of the homeland when the Japanese Navy was urgently demanding that the Armysend reinforcements to the Solomons.”).172 Refer to § 5.5.6.3 (Harassing Fires).173 Cf. LAUTERPACHT, II OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 528-29 (§214eb) (“It is also probable that till the end ofthe War the aerial bombardment by the Allies did not assume the complexion of bombing for the exclusive purpose212