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In addition, as a general matter, analogous provisions of the GPW and GC may be helpfulfor understanding the requirements in international law for conducting detention operationsbecause the baseline standards for such operations during armed conflict are not more restrictiveupon States than the requirements with respect to POWs and civilian internees under the GPWand GC, respectively. 20In this Chapter, cross-references to sections that address analogous GPW and GCrequirements are used for the purposes described above.8.1.4.5 Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in InternationalMilitary Operations. From 2007 to 2012, U.S. representatives participated, along with those of23 other States and from several international organizations, in a process led by the Governmentof Denmark to formulate principles and guidelines on the handling of detainees in internationalmilitary operations. 21 Participants in the Copenhagen Process sought to develop principles toguide the implementation of the existing obligations with respect to detention in internationalmilitary operations and to promote best practices. 22 The Copenhagen Process Principles andGuidelines is not a text of a legally binding nature. 2320 For example, In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’sDetention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, Misc. No. 08-442, 1 (D.D.C., Mar. 13, 2009)(“The laws of war have evolved primarily in the context of international armed conflicts between the armed forcesof nation states. This body of law, however, is less well-codified with respect to our current, novel type of armedconflict against armed groups such as al-Qaida and the Taliban. Principles derived from law-of-war rules governinginternational armed conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority Congress hasauthorized for the current armed conflict. … The President also has the authority under the AUMF [Authorizationfor the Use of Military Force] to detain in this armed conflict those persons whose relationship to al-Qaida or theTaliban would, in appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, render themdetainable.”).21 Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines I (“The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees inInternational Military Operations (The Copenhagen Process) was launched on 11 October 2007 and was concludedin Copenhagen on 19 October 2012. Representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa,Sweden, Tanzania, the Netherlands, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States of Americaparticipated in The Copenhagen Process meetings. Representatives of the African Union (AU), the European Union(EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) also attended The Copenhagen Process meetings as observers. Representatives of civilsociety were also consulted at various stages of The Copenhagen Process;”).22 Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines II (“During The Copenhagen Process meetings participants –while not seeking to create new legal obligations or authorizations under international law – confirmed the desire todevelop principles to guide the implementation of the existing obligations with respect to detention in internationalmilitary operations; … Participants were also inspired by the good practices that States and organisations havedeveloped in international military operations;”).23 Chairman’s Commentary to the Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, 16.2 (“This savings clausealso recognises that The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines is not a text of a legally binding nature andthus, does not create new obligations or commitments. Furthermore, The Copenhagen Process Principles andGuidelines cannot constitute a legal basis for detention. Although some language, e.g., Principle 2, may reflect legalobligations in customary and treaty law, The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines are intended to reflectgenerally accepted standards. In such instances, the applicability and binding nature of those obligations isestablished by treaty law or customary international law, as applicable, and not by The Copenhagen ProcessPrinciples and Guidelines. Since The Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines were not written as a491