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These are closely analogous to the duties that neutral States have under the law ofneutrality to refrain from supporting military operations against belligerents. 207In particular, States are required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their territory isnot used by non-State armed groups for purposes of armed activities—including planning,threatening, perpetrating, or providing material support for armed attacks—against other Statesand their interests. 208 The failure to fulfill this duty may have consequences in regard to whetherother States that are threatened by these armed activities must seek the consent of that Statebefore taking action in self-defense in that State’s territory. 209Violations of law of war treaties applicable to non-international armed conflict by a Stategenerally have not been understood to provide an independent basis in international law for anon-belligerent State to intervene against the violating State in that conflict. 21017.18.2 Duty of Belligerent States to Respect the Sovereignty of Other States. States thatare engaged in hostilities against non-State armed groups must respect the sovereignty of otherStates. 211 In general, States must obtain the consent of a territorial State before conductingmilitary operations against a non-State armed group in that State’s territory. 212participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within itsterritory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve athreat or use of force.”).207 See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International law and the ‘war on terrorism,’ 78 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS301, 313 (2002) (“By allowing Al-Qa’ida to operate from the territory which it controlled, the Taliban—and thusAfghanistan—violated the general duty of a state under international law not to allow its territory to be used as abase for attacks on other states. … At the very least, its position was analogous to that of a neutral state whichallows a belligerent to mount military operations from its territory: even though it is not responsible for thoseoperations, it exposes itself to the risk of lawful military action to put a stop to them. Similarly, where a state allowsterrorist organizations to mount concerted operations against other states from its territory and refuses to take theaction required by international law to put a stop to such operations, the victims of those operations are entitled totake action against those terrorists.”); H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against ForeignStates, 22 AJIL 105, 127 (1928) (“The nearest approach to what is believed to be the true juridical construction ofthe state’s duty to prevent organized hostile expeditions from proceeding in times of peace against a friendly statewill be found in the law of neutrality. … The two situations being closely analogous, it is only natural that they areregulated in Great Britain and in the United States in the same legal enactments. The law of hostile expeditions isnothing else than the law of neutrality in relation to an actual or impending civil war.”).208 Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent orActual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AJIL 1, 7 (2012) (“9. States are required to take all reasonable stepsto ensure that their territory is not used by nonstate actors for purposes of armed activities—including planning,threatening, perpetrating, or providing material support for armed attacks—against other states and their interests.”).209 Refer to § 17.18.2 (Duty of Belligerent States to Respect the Sovereignty of Other States).210 See, e.g., CCW AMENDED art. 1(5) (“Nothing in this Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be invoked as ajustification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal orexternal affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.”). Consider AP II art.2(2) (“Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for anyreason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in theterritory of which that conflict occurs.”). Refer to § 1.11.4.4 (Humanitarian Intervention).211 See, e.g., Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel, Department of Defense, National Security Law, Lawyers, andLawyering in the Obama Administration, Feb. 22, 2012, 2012 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN1048