Université de Montréal - Thèse sous forme numérique

50beyond reasonable doubt (Bridge, 1994: 173) ; hypothèque = mortgage(Bridge, 1994: 152).In fact, most terminologists concerned with the elaboration of legal dictionariesoften reflect on the notion of functional equivalence and they do it either to accept it(Groffier and Reed 1990; Sandrini 1995, 1996, 1999; Chromá 2004) or to reject it (deGroot 1990; Šarčević 1991, 2000). Section 2.2.4 gives further details on the approachesadopted by these authors.Another notion that has been used in legal translation is the ‗principle of legalequivalence‘ which is akin to functional equivalence. Briefly, according to thisprinciple, legal translation will seek to achieve identity of meaning between originaland translation, i.e. identity of propositional content as well as the identity of legaleffects (Sager 1994: 180). For all these reasons, it seems that this type of equivalencecannot be discarded in legal terminology.2.2.1.6. Creation and discovery[Q6] “Is equivalence „discovered‟ (does it exist prior to being established by thelexicographer) or is it „created‟ by the lexicographer‟s act?”If one accepts senses are artefacts of lexicographic analysis as some authors defend theyare (Wierzbicka 1992, 1993; Rivelis 2007), it is very relevant to ask whether theestablishment of equivalents is a matter of creation or discovery.For Adamska-Sałaciak, cognitive equivalence is discovered while explanatoryequivalence, translational equivalence and functional equivalence are created. She thusseems to disagree with Hartmann (2007 [1985]: 16) when he claims that ―lexicalequivalence does not exist until it has been established as a result of a bilingualconscious act‖. Werner (1999: 1867) also believes that equivalence is created with a