- Page 1 and 2: THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD: ASSESSI
- Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS Foreword .................
- Page 5 and 6: FOREWORD It is a distinct honor to
- Page 7: have been extremely satisfied with
- Page 12 and 13: their measures to improve the situa
- Page 14 and 15: in the Asia-Pacific region, further
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- Page 18 and 19: Second, the prosperous-nation-stron
- Page 20 and 21: egy. National defense modernization
- Page 22 and 23: advances, current Chinese leaders a
- Page 24 and 25: Chinese leaders are well aware of t
- Page 26 and 27: transformation in military affairs.
- Page 28 and 29: Indeed, the United States now deplo
- Page 30 and 31: through their learning from the U.S
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- Page 34 and 35: ings on future wars depict a more p
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- Page 38 and 39: of this PLAN fleet clearly has impl
- Page 40 and 41: contribute to China’s foreign and
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- Page 44 and 45: forces in both the defense and the
- Page 46 and 47: For a long time, American leaders h
- Page 48 and 49: 14. Chinese leaders chose to use th
- Page 50 and 51: 26. Su Xisheng (苏希胜) et al.,
- Page 53 and 54: CHAPTER 2 THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION
- Page 55 and 56: fold extensive, changing local secu
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- Page 59 and 60: 2 years earlier. After tracking in
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Even though the security situation
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THE PLA AND CHINA’S FOREIGN POLIC
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Vice-Chairman and Politburo member
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PLA NEAR-TERM CONCERNS With cross-S
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the entire period with: “The whol
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of the United States deployed in th
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Daily article criticized the docume
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India does not match China in econo
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tential threat to China’s most im
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pulse of the other, even as suspici
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in rebuilding the country has been
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The SCO nonetheless allows both to
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warned against Vietnam’s planned
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and South China Seas, although thes
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August 2009 meeting of the MMCA and
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ness of Japan. Moreover, the PLA kn
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wan issue and agreed to expand mili
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invasion of China is anticipated. S
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operations was clearly designed to
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mitments Beijing has already made a
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11. Major General Shou Xiaosong,
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34. Liu Yang and Guo Feng, “What
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57. James Manicom, “China’s Cla
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CHAPTER 3 DISCOURSE IN 3-D: THE PLA
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“under high technology conditions
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to command the gun (as Mao famously
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of that year and then first cited i
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arms into full play, combine offens
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. . . military deterrence, military
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the post-Mao era. However, against
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ship between construction of core m
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to spearhead efforts in this area.
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oots party entities, government ent
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merous nonwar activities and heavil
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ational capabilities. As James Q. W
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disappear, there may be voices clai
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mands of military modernization and
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3 1. China’s N
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11. China’s National Defense in 2
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32. According to the 2009 Defense W
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53. Conversations with PLA research
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the field about the continued relev
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ment of most serious Party disputes
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China’s case is a lot more compli
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East China Seas to exercise maximum
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obsessed more with the high-tech
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a natural requirement for officers
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and the CMC military affairs). This
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pact on China’s relations with ma
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Party Center (党中央). 35 This s
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HU JINTAO AND CHINA’S CHANGING CI
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predictability in his interaction w
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his control over the gun at the sam
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Challenge Ahead: In Search of the N
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in Party affairs. In contrast, Li i
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Secretary General. This is a positi
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differences that are often times in
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in Hu’s hands. Lengthy debate is
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is how to pursue the next round of
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convinced people. For the sake of m
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Terrorist threats remain real, alth
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y a strategic question of whether M
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no longer routine, especially given
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5. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoG
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18. The U.S. Secretary of State con
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vilian leaders what they should not
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46. Wen’s power lies in the State
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60. You Ji, “Taiwan in the Politi
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78. Liu Yongxin, “连锁反应背
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CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE C4
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pivotal year in the PLA’s quest f
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and information support capabilitie
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4. Innovation consists of making le
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increase. In developing information
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1. In 1978, a phase-one network est
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960-1,215 MHz frequency band. 42 As
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Communication problems have also ar
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联合作战). This transition from
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fundamental impediment to fostering
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such training has been done on a te
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The 2005 training goals stressed
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to “promote the healthy and order
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make overall plans for joint traini
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est, suggests that a lack of a basi
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Despite the emphasis on information
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explore opportunities. These effort
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5. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski
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28. Ibid., p. 138. 29. Zhou Ming,
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Type of Theater Joint Command Infor
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66. Zhang Liansong and Liu Jing,
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Demonstration and Planning Meeting
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making under difficult circumstance
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The PRC only began to build a forma
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that the primary responsibility for
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As they considered the lessons lear
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in Wenchuan County in the western p
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to a number of weak points from whi
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unifying, and streamlining a pletho
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government statistics that indicate
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ights. The Menglian incident involv
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line. Similar to the Weng’an and
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ing out of internal security tasks.
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usual insignia of either the police
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XINJIANG: THE URUMQI RIOT When it r
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lessons, if any, the PLA/PAP and th
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When they did move in to reassert c
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of the military in an emergency man
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PAP would presumably draw on the ta
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2008 and in Urumqi in 2009 is indic
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ternal MOOTW has, in fact, had any
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tions on policing and internal secu
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16. “Martial Law of the People’
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Military’s Earthquake Response Le
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(PLA Daily), June 9, 2008, p. 1; We
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58. For example, on September 5, 20
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68. Yu Jianrong, Yang Huijing and X
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of the nature and seriousness of th
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91. Murray Scot Tanner, quoted in E
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103. Patel, “Chinese Disaster Rel
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CHAPTER 7 CHINESE SEA POWER IN ACTI
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tary operations capabilities.” 6
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sible solution to an unexpected but
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China’s 3 decades of involvement
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The PLAN chose some of its newest,
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Vessel Hull # Class Type Displaceme
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jing’s official news media consta
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These very cautious rules of engage
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PLAN warship(s) will maintain simil
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guarded the Chinese merchant ship Z
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EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL, AND LOGISTICS
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Fourth Deployment: On October 30, 2
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ector of the PLAN headquarters gene
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The most dramatic innovations in sa
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tional counterparts. Combined Task
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So why is Beijing making this effor
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litical systems and ideology are at
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Zhang Zhaoyin, deputy group army co
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maintenance activities in African p
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Platform Nuclear Attack Submarines
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To be sure, proponents of SLOC defe
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sions, but it may gradually acquire
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for great power influence and rival
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crisis, as they would be harming re
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In the future, any facilities that
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carriers might rapidly become an im
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mons. In fact, the prospects for Ch
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enefit from diversion of U.S. atten
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13. Andrew S. Erickson, “Pipe Dre
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China is not similarly involved in
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40. Huang Li, p. 178. 41. Ibid., pp
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62. “Piracy Draws China Back to t
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85. “China Ready to Pay Ransom to
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106. See several articles on “Res
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121. Lt. Jennifer Cragg, “Navy Ta
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143. Phoenix TV, July 23, 2009; Jam
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第一次党代表会代表时强
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164. The author must credit Nan Li
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number of factors, including observ
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183. Senior Captain Xu Qi, PLAN,
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tive attack submarines, many more r
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CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARM
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Though limited in number, these exe
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Russia 6 Multiple SCO Members 4 Kyr
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The post-9/11 threat of al-Qaida an
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which “a group of international t
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off with each other just like old f
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After the air forces had attained d
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port.” 27 The live-fire portion o
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elements from two Mechanized Infant
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Observers frequently hear similar s
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Mai, Thailand. “Strike-2008” wa
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have been the “first” such even
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hensive Training Base, Guilin. Sixt
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The live demonstration phase of the
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ernment has cracked down on several
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sion-2009.” As for PAP training i
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ut only to limited degrees for the
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creasing time and distance traveled
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As such, they present outsiders an
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ilities, among other subjects. Howe
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in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobel
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jun Bao Online in Chinese, December
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54. “First Sino-Russian port emer
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68. “Coordination of PRC, Russian
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85. “Full text: China’s African
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Exercise-01 APPENDIX - CHAPTER 8 CH
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CHAPTER 9 MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH C
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ization, has caused anxiety among t
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6. To independently develop militar
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defense consultations as an importa
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it appears that foreign naval and a
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communicates a positive and reassur
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Years Number of Foreign Number of F
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According to the 1998 Defense White
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Master Sergeant James A. Roy, led t
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in their ability to venture beyond
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tion.” According to the Council o
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vide training and familiarization i
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and news media to observe it up clo
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“Operational Diplomacy”: Peacek
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PLAN launched in 2007, for HA-DR ef
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sale of Chinese arms abroad and to
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The increasing scope and sophistica
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16. “Appendix III: Participation
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34. China’s National Defense in 2
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55. “Major overseas visits of PLA
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75. Ibid.; China’s National Defen
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89. “China’s Growing Role in UN
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107. Siva Govindasamy, “Dubai 09:
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• December 2007: Kenya, Kuwait, a
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ENDNOTES - APPENDIX B - CHAPTER 9 1
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Egypt, Finland (2), Greece, Hungary
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CHAPTER 10 EMERGING GRAND STRATEGY
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of higher learning and other civili
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duration, and would depend heavily
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tutions, defense companies, univers
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lining government agency functions.
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creation of MIIT. This office’s p
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other countries closely and made th
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compare favorably to 80 percent in
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ernment’s initiatives to overhaul
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vestment. 77 Yet by the end of 2005
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In reality, however, numerous limit
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defense and civilian research and i
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agement. This includes many key SOE
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China Academy of Engineering Physic
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a new Defense Industry Alliance was
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absorbed and combined with in-house
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China’s defense establishment org
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sets (mainly in CASC) such as with
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United States but failed. It then t
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vation that would result would inev
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will grow increasingly difficult an
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technology, large oil and gas field
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15. Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), at Pre
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the National Defense Industry’s
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People’s Liberation Army”), CMC
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es Entering the Defense Industry Se
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70. These two regulations have been
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82. Responsibilities of CSRC in off
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percent of defense corporation is u
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101. “Zhejiang Province Determine
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tutes, funded by the NRDC; and tech
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130. Denis Fred Simon and Cong Cao,
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146. Universities, for example, Tsi
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Enterprise China North Optical-Elec
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Industry Investment Fund: APPENDIX
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10. Zhao Bo, “武器装备应用
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of China (PRC) in late 1949, milita
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This chapter seeks to provide an ov
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sional journals, such as Logistics
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USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrie
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will examine China’s current logi
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tribution, health service support [
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force, such as food, water and ice,
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LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION GOALS AND
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3. Sustainment of Units Abroad, and
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Phase Three: • Under the joint le
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zone” (战区), while joint logis
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• All supporting facilities in th
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educed. Wary of the cost of militar
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user. As a result, these innovation
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As the link between the war front a
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tion distribution centers for close
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Date Mission Location Observers Tro
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than 50 kinds of 5 major categories
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ties, 118 while enhancing China’s
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acy missions in the Gulf of Aden, a
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• Decentralization versus central
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY Truth
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U.S. commitments to Taiwan. If Chin
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3. The Army has been the main force
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19. See, for example, Ngok Lee, Chi
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37. Joint core logistics capabiliti
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58. Wang Guanghui and Wang Youlin,
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78. Feng Yongmin, Zhang Lingling, a
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“A Study of the Strategy of Build
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115. Antonio Castillo, “China in
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• Three Generation (三代) refor
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ning, building, and using in a unif
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2005 • Hu Jintao asked military t
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2009 • Jan—Chinese missile-arme
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2. Hu Fuwen, “On Realizing the Pr
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30. Ren Pan and Ju Zhenhau, “’P
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Wang Jinghai (王京海) Zhao Zhanp
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Jin Xiuman (金秀满) Military Veh
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Chen Guoshu (陈国书) Li Guangren
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Li Wanjun (荔万俊) An Introducti
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Guo Qinmao (郭钦茂) Wang Benhong
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS DANIEL ALDER
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policy, and technology issues, has
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where she analyzed the frequency an
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SUSAN M. PUSKA, a retired U.S. Army
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macy, Foreign Policy and Defense St