The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

litical systems and ideology are at the very roots of the
problem. 137
This individual believed that “anti-piracy cooperation
on the high seas should be separated” from these issues,
but that there were still many “hardliners” who
disagreed. 138 In Huang Li’s view, if China joined CTF-
151,
the naval commander of China has the chance to be
the commander of a few dozen warships from various
countries, including those of the sea powers of the day.
In this way, [he] will not only develop ability to direct
the concerted actions of large-sized squadrons of many
countries, but also gain the chance of directly communicating
and cooperating with the U.S. Navy. Of course,
when not serving as the commander of the combined
force, we also need to accept the directions of others,
and that may be something which we are most unwilling
to do. 139
REACTIONS TO THE MISSION
Responses to the mission both at home and abroad
appear to have exceeded the expectations of China’s
leadership and analysts. For the PLA, for which these
dimensions are intimately connected, this is particularly
good news. As a party army, it must rely to an
unusual degree on the support of both China’s increasingly
sophisticated and informed public—who have
been disenchanted by the PLA’s involvement in government
corruption and crises since the 1980s—and its
civilian leaders, who must grapple increasingly with
how other nations view China’s rapid military development
even as they count on the PLA to safeguard
their rule and defend the nation’s security interests. 140
327