The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

• All supporting facilities in the theater/war
zone are centrally managed.
• The support of supplies is provided from the
nearest location.
• The PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery logistics
commands in Jinan were eliminated. 68
• There is no longer a differentiation between
common/service unique support and materials.
• Supporting facilities, such as warehouses, hospitals
and engineering organizations, became
centrally managed/constructed.
• Deployment of logistic resources is more rational.
• The speed of logistics operations was increased.
• The percentage of non-army cadres in the department
has risen from 12 percent to 40 percent.
69
The China Defense White Paper (2006) highlighted
force reductions arising from joint logistics reform, as
follows:
Apart from special purpose depots and general hospitals
under the general headquarters/departments, the
Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, all other
rear depots, hospitals and recuperation centers have
been integrated and reorganized into the joint logistical
support system. A total of eight joint logistical subdepartments,
94 rear depots, and 47 hospitals and recuperation
centers have been closed. 70
Despite organizational and operational improvements
to joint logistics since Joint reforms began in
2000, and the Jinan MR pilot test began in 2004, many
barriers continue to impede the development of an
effective Joint logistics system throughout the armed
forces. As a result, problems in support for mobile
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