The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

69. Beijing has cancelled a number of diplomatic programs
with Australia. Its position to Canberra’s application for a UNSC
seat seems to be even more elusive now. Without Beijing’s support,
it seems Canberra does not need to bother making such an
attempt.
70. Yan Xuetong, “Reasoning for containing Taiwan independence
through use of force,” Zhanliu yu guanli, No. 3, 2004, p. 1.
You Ji, “China’s New National Defence Strategy, Naval Transformation
and The Taiwan Conflict,” Stockholm Journal of East Asian
Studies, Vol. 15, 2005, pp. 75-88.
71. Talk with a Chinese bank executive in Sydney in May
2008. In addition, the pace of integration has accelerated since Ma
came to power. Now the proportion of Taiwan’s university graduates
who have an intension to work in the mainland has risen
from 51 percent to 73 percent. 两岸开讲 (Talks Across Strait), CTV
(Taipei), September 5, 2009.
72. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang (李克, 郝慎彰), 文化大革命中
的人民解放军 (The PLA in the Cultural Revolution), Beijing, China:
Zhongguo dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989.
73. For more analysis on China’s purchase of Russian arms,
see You Ji, “Friends in Needs or Comrades in Arms: Sino-Russo
Military Cooperation,” Andrew Tan, ed., The Global Arms Trade,
London, UK: Routledge, 2009.
74. You Ji, “Revolution in Military Thinking,” in Bo Huldt
and Masako Ikegami, eds., China Rising, Stockholm, Sweden: The
Swedish National Defence College, and Helsinki, Finland: The
Finnish National Defence University, 2008, pp. 335-364.
75. I doubt if the PLA is really serious about building carriers
for combat purposes. There is no evidence that any decision on
this project has been made.
76. The mentioning of this multiple nature of external threats
has become more frequent, as seen from Hu’s speeches and PLA
documents, such as the Defense White Paper in 2008.
77. This is by the traditional Chinese geographic definition
that uses the Yellow River as the dividing line.
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