The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Exercise artificialities, such as compressing the
battlefield so it can be observed from nearby reviewing
stands, limited timeframes (often counted in minutes
or hours), daylight operations (so that VIPs can
see the festivities), result in many exercises devolving
into heavily scripted tactical drills or firepower demonstrations.
Because the demonstrations take place
in daylight, night operations have not been required.
Since these exercises are over within hours, supplies
of batteries are not expended, vehicles do not run out
of fuel, troops and commanders do not need to sleep
in the field, and the enemy does not vary much from
its initial disposition. When the battlefield is confined
to what can be seen from the reviewing stand, SOF
and airborne forces are not employed in the enemy’s
rear when and where they would be in actual operations.
When the exercise is completely preplanned,
commanders follow timelines instead of making decisions
based on actual conditions. In other words, the
military operations on display at most of the larger
combined exercises lack the reality of modern combat
against either an unconventional enemy or larger,
modern military opponent.
Nonetheless, some training value is generated as
staffs plan and monitor initial operations, troops practice
combat drills, and logistics personnel maintain
equipment and support troops away from base. Ironically,
individual soldiers probably improve their own
skills most during the smallest combined exercises
where they are teamed up with foreign forces and test
themselves in extended exercises.
The PLA is attempting to rectify similar shortcomings
in its own unilateral exercises by emphasizing
realistic conditions (currently operations in a complex
electro-magnetic environment is the buzzword), in-
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