The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

China’s defense establishment organized its nuclear
weapons and missile and satellite programs, the heavy
hand of government management is also evident with
high-tech initiatives, as seen with the experience of
Zhongguancun (中关村) high-tech zone. 136 The stifling
effect of government can also be seen in the control
over important ingredients of innovation—autonomy,
free access to and flow of information, even dissent,
both scientific and political. As one observer of China’s
S&T culture notes, “if researchers and entrepreneurs
are not able to think outside the box . . . the success of
the innovation strategy is called into question.” 137
IMPACT ON MILITARY MODERNIZATION
This chapter has attempted to address two basic
issues: China’s decision to pursue CMI, and its emerging
strategy to achieve it. But what impact will it have
on China’s military modernization ambitions? How
do we measure its progress and what is the end-game?
There is no question that China’s past reforms have
already produced substantial results across a broad
spectrum of weapon systems. But the most impressive
achievements have been primarily in legacy defense
industries such as missiles, shipping, and aviation.
Whether it is China’s anti-satellite weapons, the
anti-ship ballistic missile, DH-10 cruise missile, or the
Shang class nuclear attack submarine, these are formidable
weapons. But, while they may have acute strategic
implications—even U.S. game changers in specific
theatres of potential conflict—they do not constitute
leap-ahead technologies or disruptive innovations
that permanently alter U.S. military superiority. For
the most part, these weapons are upgrades and incremental
improvements on systems that have been in
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