The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

his control over the gun at the same time he became
Party leader. Yet, that he was able to turn something
negative into positive shows his political maturity. In
a way, this also reflects the changing nature of China’s
civil-military relations.
Third, soliciting popular support as a means of civilian
control of the gun is not new, but neither Deng
nor Jiang was able to achieve this at a high level, as
they remained controversial among large sections of
the population. Hu is the only key CCP leader against
whom I have never heard something negative among
Beijing’s taxi drivers. 48 This is largely due to Hu’s revisionist
social policy agenda that leans public finance
towards under-privileged classes. 49 This has resulted
in his rising popularity among the masses, which has
helped him lay a firmer civilian foundation to control
the military. This outside-in method of commanding
the gun turned out to be a more effective take-over
plan than hasty penetration into the armed forces
through creating a pro-Hu personal network. Traditionally,
the latter way is a common practice for party
leaders to control the gun. From Mao to Jiang the
PLA was their primary power base and a short cut for
power accumulation. 50 However, this brought about
unintended consequences: the factionalized top brass
and increased military influence in domestic politics,
to name a few. Hu’s reliance on the leader’s popular
legitimacy as a method of civilian control over the gun
is less risky than the tactics of divide-and-rule.
Finally, Hu takes good care of PLA interests and
is thus welcome by the military. One of his early efforts
was to iron out a Party consensus on the IT/
RMA as a way of PLA transformation. His first formal
speech on military affairs in a rare Politburo study
session in May 2003 was designed to prepare for his
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