The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

tion. The vocabulary is familiar, as it was expressed
to support Mao and Deng before. The PLA Air Force
Party Committee made it clear that supporting Hu’s
idea of scientific development was a matter of political
attitudes on the part of soldiers. 40 In other words,
this symbolized the PLA’s loyalty to the new civilian
leadership. Other services also pledged similar allegiance.
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Dealing with Transitional Uncertainties.
Upon assuming office, Hu, like Jiang before him,
confronted a huge challenge in authority building visà-vis
the PLA. At the core of this challenge is the reality
that the old method of strongmen control, the way of
Mao and Deng, is no longer viable. Yet the new method
of control in the form of erecting institutionalized
safeguards is still far from complete. If not handled
properly, a transitional vacuum may emerge with military
strongmen or ambitious politicians inclined to
manipulate the civil-military relations to their advantage.
This has happened many times in Chinese history.
The many firsts about Hu’s power consolidation,
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, may have
shown that the challenge has been coped well with,
although it is still too early to conclude that a pattern
has been molded for his successors to follow in the
future. In a way, Hu’s new method of commanding
the gun continues Jiang’s effort to turn the PLA into
a professional and noninterventionist force, although
still loyal to the Party. It keeps abreast with the Party’s
own institutionalization of power.
Hu’s succession and consolidation strategy has attributed
to his quick ascendance as a powerful commander
in chief. This strategy minimized any un-
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