The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

ut only to limited degrees for the former. Combined
ground force training, which has focused exclusively
on non-traditional security missions with anti-terrorism
at the fore, requires detailed staff planning,
implementation of multinational command and control
procedures, often long-distance rail or air deployment,
and logistics support and sustainment of troops
frequently in austere environments. These tasks are
necessary for warfighting, so some operational benefit
accrues to the PLA in these aspects. Many nontraditional
security missions, especially anti-terrorist
operations, also include the execution of tactical procedures
that have important warfighting applications,
such as reconnaissance and surveillance, the tactical
use of helicopters, close quarter battle drill, sniper operations,
chemical defense, and medical evacuation, to
name a few topics.
Yet, the combined exercise scenarios have been
carefully constructed for the most part to deal with relatively
small, ill-equipped, and immobile terrorist or
criminal forces. The enemy is more the “Terrorist Version
One” bad guy who takes hostages and hides out
in the hills than the various forms of flexible, thinking
foes that have emerged on contemporary battlefields.
So far, Chinese forces and their exercise partners apparently
have not had to contend with the use of improvised
explosive devices, suicide bombers, rocket
and mortar attacks, rocket-propelled grenades fired at
low-level helicopters, or unsecure supply lines, rear
area logistics bases, and command posts. Movements
into the exercise zone have been conducted administratively
with time allotted for arriving troops to acclimate,
orient themselves to their new situation, and
rehearse battle drills. Friendly forces have had total
control of the air and sea or achieve it with little enemy
resistance.
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