The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

stitutionalization within civil-military relations. In
other words, a level of autonomy is the precondition
for the PLA to reshape of the relationship of symbiosis
with the Party.
At the organizational level, thanks to the unparalleled
power of the CMC, which is made up entirely by
professional soldiers except for its chair, the military
has achieved a relatively independent status vis-àvis
the center of state power. This can be seen from
the following points. In terms of the decisionmaking
process, the CMC is under the Politburo in the Party’s
hierarchical chain. However, in actuality it operates
largely outside the latter’s reach under the formula
of “政治局议政, 军委议军 (the Politburo takes charge
of political affairs and the CMC military affairs),” as
mentioned earlier. Unless invited, no civilian Politburo
member can sit in CMC weekly meetings where
key decisions are decided by the top brass. But, some
of the key decisions may be presented to weekly Politburo
or PSC meetings for approval. The next step is
normally a formality, as CMC proposals are already
agreed to by the General Secretary. On personnel matters,
the CC Central Organizational Department formally
transferred PLA cadre management responsibility
to the PLA General Cadre Department on August
14, 1950, at Mao’s order. 34 This amounted to severing
the Party’s command chain over the PLA’s personnel
system. According to the current “PLA Active Duty
Officer Appointment Regulations and Procedures,”
with the CMC chair’s authorization in the form of his
signature, the CMC can automatically appoint commanders
up to the level of heads of the Dadanwei
(大单位): headquarters departments, military regions,
three special services, and the People’s Armed Police
(PAP). No word is mentioned about the role of the
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