The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

As they considered the lessons learned from the
ice and snow emergency, writers in Guofang (国防 National
Defense) and other publications pointed to the
importance of PLA, PAP, militia, and reserves having
the right equipment and the right training to deal with
emergencies. During the snow and ice emergency,
Nanjing was able to keep its major bridges across the
Yangzi open because 10 years earlier, they had set
aside funds to purchase snow-plows. 21 Most areas of
the south, however, did not have snow and ice removal
equipment: PLA, PAP, militia, and reserve personnel
often had to rely on simple tools and hard manual
labor. 22 Even in Liaoning Province in the Northeast,
PLA soldiers assigned to take part in disaster relief after
a snowstorm had to rely on shovels and pickaxes.
Local governments in Liaoning did have snow and ice
removal equipment, but the army units assigned to assist
in this disaster relief effort did not. 23
The lack of equipment was tied to larger issues of
preparation and mobilization. The experience of the
ice and snow emergency was used to argue for the importance
of better emergency response planning and
the need to build technically specialized units within
the militia and reserves—units that would be prepared
to deal with tasks ranging from repair of electrical
generation and transmission facilities, first-aid
and rescue, transportation, and other specialized areas.
24 Beyond that, some commentators pointed to the
snow and ice emergency’s implications for the PLA’s
preparedness to fight local wars under informatized
conditions. Pointing to an alleged 1999 RAND Corporation
scenario for war between the United States and
China which had envisioned the American air strikes
cutting China’s north-south transportation lines and
electrical grid so as to paralyze south China and cause
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