The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

forming many missions, and hence are not restricted
to a specific role in specific waters. Their political masters
presumably find them useful to perform a variety
of missions in a wide range of circumstances and locations
(e.g., both a Taiwan context and deployments
farther afield). But to fully pursue robust long-range
capabilities, new platforms and force structures would
be needed. With respect to force structure, indicators
of a more ambitious Chinese naval presence, particularly
in the area of SLOC protection, would likely include
the following, as Table 5 indicates.
Capability Approach
Anti-Submarine
Warfare
Long-range Air
Power
Military Ship
Production
At-Sea
Replenishment
Remote Ship
Repair
Operational
Readiness
Overall Capacity
Construction of nuclear attack submarines and deployment of additional
units of these and other platforms with significant demonstrated ASW
capabilities. 167
Development of carriers, aircraft and/or helicopters to operate off them,
and related doctrine and training programs. 168
Establishment of new, modern shipyards dedicated to military ship
production or expansion of areas in coproduction yards that are dedicated
to military ship production. 169
Expansion of the PLAN auxiliary fleet, particularly long-range, high-speed
oilers and replenishment ships. 170
Development of the ability to conduct sophisticated ship repairs remotely,
either through tenders or overseas repair facilities. 171
Steady deployment of PLAN forces to vulnerable portions of the sea lanes
to increase operational familiarity and readiness.
Maturation of advanced levels of PLA doctrine, training, and human
capital.
Table 5: Indicators of Emerging PLAN Blue Water
SLOC Protection Capabilities.
The PLAN’s capabilities in key areas (assets,
trained personnel, and experience) are currently insufficient
to support long-range SLOC defense mis-
336