The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Indeed, the United States now deploys more than
half of its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines,
Aegis destroyers, and strategic bombers in
the Asia-Pacific region. The apprehension about U.S.
strategic intent, therefore, is the driver for much of the
PLA’s modernization programs and doctrinal evolution
encompassing all realms of military operations
from space to submarine warfare.
China’s defense modernization, unfortunately and
unavoidably, has in turn deepened U.S. apprehension
about China’s intent and the impact of China’s growing
power. It has also generated concerns from China’s
neighbors across Asia, a natural outgrowth of the
security dilemma in international relations. China is
aware of this negative impact. Chinese President Hu
Jintao has taken measures to address this issue. One
noted measure is to stress the PLA’s non-war roles
and responsibilities. The other is to promote Hu’s calls
for a “harmonious world” (in September 2005 at the
United Nations (UN) 60th anniversary), and “harmonious
oceans” (at the PLA Navy’s 60th anniversary in
April 2009).
Godwin closes the chapter with the observation
that resolving U.S.-China mutual apprehension is important,
for it involves more than the bilateral relationship
between the two great nations. In essence, all of
Asia is watching the dynamics of the Sino-American
relationship. The United States can take advantage of
the realities recognized by Hu Jintao and the PLA and
systematically and deliberately build on the commitments
Beijing has already made and to some extent
implemented, namely, China’s commitment to stay
engaged with global affairs, China’s promise that its
defense modernization would not disturb the security
arrangement in Asia, China’s commitment to increase
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