The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Despite the emphasis on informationized operations,
informationization does pose dangers for
the PLA. By developing into a networked force just
like the U.S. military, the PLA opens itself up to the
same sorts of vulnerabilities that it hopes to exploit
in the U.S. C4ISR system. This reduction of asymmetry
could be advantageous to the U.S. military and
remains a contradiction largely unaddressed in PLA
writings. Dai Qingmin admits that informationization
is a double-edged sword that will cause it “danger
and hidden troubles,” but he also recommends that at
its current stage of development the PLA should pay
more attention to its beneficial effects and ignore its
disadvantages. 92 This is most likely because the PLA,
and China, have no other alternative. China desires
to become a major power and can only do this by becoming
modern, and modernity depends on a reliance
on information technology. To remain as a largely
mechanized force forever dooms the PLA to being a
second-rate military and China a second-rate power.
Consequently, the PLA must transform into an informationized
force even if this creates vulnerabilities in
the short to medium term.
PLA writings also do not discuss another paradox
of a network-centric force: the tendency of commanders
to centralize control. Ostensibly, the benefit
of NCW is its ability to increase the ability of lowerlevel
officers to make decisions. Technology, however,
could further centralize command by enabling senior
commanders to monitor and direct small units. Considering
the PLA’s predilection for heavily centralized
command, command automation systems may
strengthen the role of the campaign commander at the
expense of limiting subordinates’ freedom of action.
These problems will eventually need to be addressed,
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