The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Party Center (党中央). 35 This simply follows the tradition
and privilege of Mao and Deng in selecting top
PLA commanders without any need to seek Politburo
opinion, not to say approval. 36 The difference in the
post-Deng era is that selection and approval of CMC
members has to come through the Politburo process.
However, this is exclusively based on CMC recommendations
because, first, members in the PSC are not
personally familiar with PLA generals; and, second,
they know personnel power is seriously guarded by
the CMC chair. Moreover, ties between top civil and
military leaders are predominantly business oriented,
leaving little room for personal preference. Thus, Hu
has further strengthened the CMC’s autonomy. Under
Hu, PLA nominations have basically become professional
and functional, with fixed terms and little connection
to civilian factional networks and major policy
debates. Therefore, there is little need for PSC members
to oppose any particular appointee. Today, this
pattern of PLA appointment has taken the form of a
tradition—a norm and rules of the game. Both civilian
and PLA leaders know that any serious breach of
this tradition could be both disruptive to civil-military
interaction and politically expensive. Therefore, few
people are likely to rock the boat.
The lack of reinforceable organizational means
over PLA personnel matters has resulted in CCP political
leadership over military affairs in the form of Party
leadership in providing ideological guidance and
the Party line to the PLA. 37 The rhetoric Party Center
has gradually become an abstract concept to soldiers,
as compared with the word CMC. The state administration
has no agency overseeing military affairs. This
political division of power erects a firewall that allows
the top brass to concentrate on military management.
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