The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

improved cross-strait relations (following the March
election of Ma Ying-jeou), PLA prominence in disaster
relief operations (January snow storm rescues and
May Wenchuan earthquake relief operations), armed
forces involvement in the August Beijing Olympics
(performance participation and internal security),
growing participation in peacekeeping operations (including
more than 300 soldiers to the African Union/
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan
[UNAMID]), and the December decision to dispatch
an anti-piracy task force to the Gulf of Aden.
The PLA is experiencing mission creep writ large.
Repeatedly PLA authors stress the necessity of soldiers
focusing on the “core (核心)” mission or capabilities:
warfighting. Indeed, regular and authoritative
utterances of this mantra seem to be aimed at reassuring
Chinese soldiers. The party and military leadership
have gone to great lengths to stress this point—
perhaps reflecting the degree to which they sense that
this is a burning issue among Chinese soldiers. As the
Liberation Army Daily staff commentator stated in the
wake of Hu Jintao’s talk to PLA delegates at the NPC
in March 2009: “The military’s raison d’être is warfighting.
Throughout history . . . the fundamental duty
of the military has always been to prepare for wars,
curb wars, wage wars, and win wars.” 47
A concentration on Taiwan contingencies helped
PLA modernization by providing a clear target. A
Taiwan scenario provided a tangible focus for the
PLA to direct training, equipment, and force structure
requirements. If this scenario recedes into the background
or is relegated to the sidelines, the focus is lost.
The value of a single scenario and challenge absorbing
PLA thinking was that it enabled the military to make
significant leaps in strategy, force planning, and oper-
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