The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

given moral and material encouragement (including
money, weapons, and military training) to forces that
sought to separate Tibet and Xinjiang from the former
Qing Empire and, after 1912, from the weak new
Chinese nation-state. 71 The political, ethnic, and international
dimensions of Tibet and Xinjiang make any
discussion the PLA/PAP’s internal security responsibilities
in these areas particularly sensitive. It is reasonable
to assume that the PLA and PAP have drawn
lessons from their operations in these areas, and particularly
from the suppression of the riots in Lhasa in
March 2008 and in Urumqi in July 2009. However, in
the open press, we have only vague hints, at best, as to
what those lessons may be.
TIBET: THE LHASA RIOT, MARCH 2008
The severe rioting that broke out in Lhasa, the capital
of the TAR, in March 2008 has been described and
analyzed by a number of scholars. The root causes of
the incident clearly lie in failed ethnic and economic
policies that have left young Tibetans unhappy and
alienated. When the unrest broke out in Lhasa, a
slow police response then allowed a volatile situation
to spin out of control. 72 Reports from Lhasa all support
the conclusion that it was PAP forces, not PLA
soldiers, who were directly responsible for restoring
order. The role of the PLA itself is difficult to gauge
with any degree of accuracy. There is some indication
that PLA units from Chengdu and perhaps elsewhere
were sent to Lhasa, where their main role is thought
to have been logistical support. 73 At least one foreign
reporter observed “military looking vehicles with telltale
license plates covered up or removed,” and troops
there wore uniforms that were distinctly lacking in the
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