The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

2008 and in Urumqi in 2009 is indicative of a broader
source of internal instability which could have a negative
impact on China’s unity in times of war. Suppression
of incidents like that in Lhasa or Urumqi, in
which the PAP has played the leading role, says much
about the PAP’s ability to control isolated incidents of
internal unrest, but little about the PLA’s warfighting
strengths or weaknesses. The occurrence and the suppression
of mass incidents that have an ethnic dimension
does present American politicians and the U.S.
State Department with opportunities (many of them
justified) for criticizing China’s human rights record.
Such criticism makes a certain amount of sense in
domestic politics within the United States, but it is of
little or no assistance to Tibetans or Uyghurs in China
and is of debatable utility for the furtherance of the
U.S. national interest in East Asia.
Finally, do internal MOOTW responsibilities represent
a significant and growing burden on the PLA?
Will these responsibilities detract from the PLA’s ability
to prepare for, train for, and carry out its central
mission of national defense (including preparation for
possible conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South
China Sea)? Can the United States expect to be dealing
with a PLA that is increasingly focused on internal
security issues and therefore has fewer resources to
devote to the development of force projection capabilities?
The short answer to those questions would be: no.
It is true that China’s military faces serious and probably
increasing internal security challenges over the
next 5 to 10 years and beyond. In early 2009, Chinese
analysts predicted that the effects of the global economic
downturn would lead to an increase in violent
mass incidents in China. China’s relatively rapid eco-
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