The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

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Secretary General. This is a position at the divisional rank, better than most incumbent CMC members at that time. In terms of seniority, he is not inferior. More importantly, his CMC experience familiarized him with the skills of running PLA daily affairs, such as the procedures for cadre nomination and promotion, troop redeployment, budgetary allocation to different services, and nuclear launch procedures. As none of any other possible fifth generation leaders (born in the 1950s) had any military experience, Xi is clearly in the best position to take over the CMC helm. This was one of the considerations of Zeng Qinghong who went to additional lengths to nominate Xi as his replacement. Yet the final say is Hu’s, given his now undisputed power vis-à-vis the PLA. His own choice was allegedly Li, whom he had groomed since 1982. Hu’s leadership style on personnel matters is to select appointees with minimal controversies. Clearly, Li is better than Xi in this regard. On the other hand, he is serious about the Party norms of collective leadership and majority rule. This was the reason why he could have blocked Zeng’s suggestion for a primary vote or later disregarded its result, but he chose not to do so. The failure of the incumbent leaders from Jiang to Hu in nominating their favored successors demonstrates the extent to which institutionalization of elite politics has evolved. But in Xi’s case, Hu would have to pay a high level of attention to PLA opinions. 58 After all, the ability of the successor to secure PLA cooperation decides the fate of the CCP. 164
TAIWAN AS A TEST TO CHINA’S EVOLVING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS As mentioned earlier, the continuation of the current smooth civil-military relations depends on some preconditions. Prominent among them is the absence of major policy disagreement between these two powerful institutions and, of course, within the Politburo. Therefore, this seemingly uneventful civil-military relationship is not a given. Among the issues that may generate policy strife is the Taiwan challenge, especially at this moment when Beijing is substantially adjusting its Taiwan policy as a result of the regime change in Taipei in May 2008. The ease of tension provides both new opportunities and challenges to joint CCP/PLA management of Taiwan affairs. Civil-Military Convergence on a Taiwan Policy. There has been a broad civil/military consensus on a Taiwan policy, which has been defined by war avoidance. But at the same time, civilians’ lofty rhetoric contrasts with tough PLA remarks. This is particularly true in Hu’s case, who has seldom used any threatening language in commenting on Taiwan affairs. 59 The usual talk about a discord between civilian and military leaders over the Taiwan issue has been exaggerated. They share a strategic view that antiindependence efforts have to be firm and persistent. 60 Beijing’s Taiwan policy is built upon two bases: peaceful inducement for reunification, and threat of force against independence. It is only natural that civilians emphasize the former and officers the latter. Any discussion of the PLA’s role in Beijing’s Taiwan policy process needs to trace the sources of their functional 165
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THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD: ASSESSI
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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FOREWORD It is a distinct honor to
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have been extremely satisfied with
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Also in 2009, the PLA Navy (PLAN) a
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their measures to improve the situa
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in the Asia-Pacific region, further
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tional Convention platform (Hu’s
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Second, the prosperous-nation-stron
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egy. National defense modernization
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advances, current Chinese leaders a
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Chinese leaders are well aware of t
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transformation in military affairs.
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Indeed, the United States now deplo
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through their learning from the U.S
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to gain an objective control measur
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ings on future wars depict a more p
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ever, is giving way to a more law-g
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of this PLAN fleet clearly has impl
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contribute to China’s foreign and
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military integration (CMI, [军民
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forces in both the defense and the
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For a long time, American leaders h
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14. Chinese leaders chose to use th
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26. Su Xisheng (苏希胜) et al.,
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CHAPTER 2 THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION
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fold extensive, changing local secu
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the Association of Southeast Asian
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2 years earlier. After tracking in
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Even though the security situation
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THE PLA AND CHINA’S FOREIGN POLIC
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Vice-Chairman and Politburo member
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PLA NEAR-TERM CONCERNS With cross-S
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the entire period with: “The whol
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of the United States deployed in th
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Daily article criticized the docume
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India does not match China in econo
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tential threat to China’s most im
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pulse of the other, even as suspici
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in rebuilding the country has been
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The SCO nonetheless allows both to
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warned against Vietnam’s planned
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and South China Seas, although thes
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August 2009 meeting of the MMCA and
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ness of Japan. Moreover, the PLA kn
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wan issue and agreed to expand mili
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invasion of China is anticipated. S
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operations was clearly designed to
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mitments Beijing has already made a
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11. Major General Shou Xiaosong,
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34. Liu Yang and Guo Feng, “What
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57. James Manicom, “China’s Cla
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CHAPTER 3 DISCOURSE IN 3-D: THE PLA
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“under high technology conditions
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to command the gun (as Mao famously
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of that year and then first cited i
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arms into full play, combine offens
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. . . military deterrence, military
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the post-Mao era. However, against
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Page 129 and 130: ational capabilities. As James Q. W
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Page 135 and 136: ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3 1. China’s N
Page 137 and 138: 11. China’s National Defense in 2
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Page 152 and 153: obsessed more with the high-tech
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Page 156 and 157: and the CMC military affairs). This
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Page 160 and 161: Party Center (党中央). 35 This s
Page 162 and 163: HU JINTAO AND CHINA’S CHANGING CI
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Page 166 and 167: his control over the gun at the sam
Page 168 and 169: Challenge Ahead: In Search of the N
Page 170 and 171: in Party affairs. In contrast, Li i
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Page 178 and 179: is how to pursue the next round of
Page 180 and 181: convinced people. For the sake of m
Page 182 and 183: Terrorist threats remain real, alth
Page 184 and 185: y a strategic question of whether M
Page 186 and 187: no longer routine, especially given
Page 188 and 189: 5. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoG
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Page 194 and 195: 46. Wen’s power lies in the State
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Page 201 and 202: CHAPTER 5 TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE C4
Page 203 and 204: pivotal year in the PLA’s quest f
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Page 213 and 214: 960-1,215 MHz frequency band. 42 As
Page 215 and 216: Communication problems have also ar
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The 2005 training goals stressed
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to “promote the healthy and order
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make overall plans for joint traini
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est, suggests that a lack of a basi
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Despite the emphasis on information
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explore opportunities. These effort
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5. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski
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28. Ibid., p. 138. 29. Zhou Ming,
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Type of Theater Joint Command Infor
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66. Zhang Liansong and Liu Jing,
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Demonstration and Planning Meeting
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making under difficult circumstance
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The PRC only began to build a forma
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that the primary responsibility for
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As they considered the lessons lear
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in Wenchuan County in the western p
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to a number of weak points from whi
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unifying, and streamlining a pletho
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government statistics that indicate
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ights. The Menglian incident involv
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line. Similar to the Weng’an and
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ing out of internal security tasks.
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usual insignia of either the police
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XINJIANG: THE URUMQI RIOT When it r
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lessons, if any, the PLA/PAP and th
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When they did move in to reassert c
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of the military in an emergency man
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PAP would presumably draw on the ta
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2008 and in Urumqi in 2009 is indic
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ternal MOOTW has, in fact, had any
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tions on policing and internal secu
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16. “Martial Law of the People’
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Military’s Earthquake Response Le
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(PLA Daily), June 9, 2008, p. 1; We
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58. For example, on September 5, 20
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68. Yu Jianrong, Yang Huijing and X
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of the nature and seriousness of th
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91. Murray Scot Tanner, quoted in E
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103. Patel, “Chinese Disaster Rel
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CHAPTER 7 CHINESE SEA POWER IN ACTI
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tary operations capabilities.” 6
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sible solution to an unexpected but
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China’s 3 decades of involvement
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The PLAN chose some of its newest,
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Vessel Hull # Class Type Displaceme
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jing’s official news media consta
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These very cautious rules of engage
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PLAN warship(s) will maintain simil
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guarded the Chinese merchant ship Z
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EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL, AND LOGISTICS
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Fourth Deployment: On October 30, 2
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ector of the PLAN headquarters gene
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The most dramatic innovations in sa
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tional counterparts. Combined Task
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So why is Beijing making this effor
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litical systems and ideology are at
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Zhang Zhaoyin, deputy group army co
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maintenance activities in African p
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Platform Nuclear Attack Submarines
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To be sure, proponents of SLOC defe
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sions, but it may gradually acquire
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for great power influence and rival
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crisis, as they would be harming re
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In the future, any facilities that
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carriers might rapidly become an im
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mons. In fact, the prospects for Ch
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enefit from diversion of U.S. atten
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13. Andrew S. Erickson, “Pipe Dre
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China is not similarly involved in
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40. Huang Li, p. 178. 41. Ibid., pp
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62. “Piracy Draws China Back to t
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85. “China Ready to Pay Ransom to
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106. See several articles on “Res
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121. Lt. Jennifer Cragg, “Navy Ta
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143. Phoenix TV, July 23, 2009; Jam
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第一次党代表会代表时强
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164. The author must credit Nan Li
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number of factors, including observ
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183. Senior Captain Xu Qi, PLAN,
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tive attack submarines, many more r
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CHAPTER 8 PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARM
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Though limited in number, these exe
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Russia 6 Multiple SCO Members 4 Kyr
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The post-9/11 threat of al-Qaida an
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which “a group of international t
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off with each other just like old f
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After the air forces had attained d
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port.” 27 The live-fire portion o
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elements from two Mechanized Infant
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Observers frequently hear similar s
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Mai, Thailand. “Strike-2008” wa
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have been the “first” such even
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hensive Training Base, Guilin. Sixt
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The live demonstration phase of the
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ernment has cracked down on several
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sion-2009.” As for PAP training i
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ut only to limited degrees for the
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creasing time and distance traveled
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As such, they present outsiders an
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ilities, among other subjects. Howe
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in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobel
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jun Bao Online in Chinese, December
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54. “First Sino-Russian port emer
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68. “Coordination of PRC, Russian
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85. “Full text: China’s African
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Exercise-01 APPENDIX - CHAPTER 8 CH
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CHAPTER 9 MILITARY EXCHANGES WITH C
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ization, has caused anxiety among t
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6. To independently develop militar
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defense consultations as an importa
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it appears that foreign naval and a
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communicates a positive and reassur
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Years Number of Foreign Number of F
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According to the 1998 Defense White
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Master Sergeant James A. Roy, led t
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in their ability to venture beyond
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tion.” According to the Council o
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vide training and familiarization i
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and news media to observe it up clo
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“Operational Diplomacy”: Peacek
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PLAN launched in 2007, for HA-DR ef
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sale of Chinese arms abroad and to
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The increasing scope and sophistica
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16. “Appendix III: Participation
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34. China’s National Defense in 2
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55. “Major overseas visits of PLA
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75. Ibid.; China’s National Defen
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89. “China’s Growing Role in UN
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107. Siva Govindasamy, “Dubai 09:
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• December 2007: Kenya, Kuwait, a
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ENDNOTES - APPENDIX B - CHAPTER 9 1
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Egypt, Finland (2), Greece, Hungary
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CHAPTER 10 EMERGING GRAND STRATEGY
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of higher learning and other civili
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duration, and would depend heavily
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tutions, defense companies, univers
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lining government agency functions.
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creation of MIIT. This office’s p
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other countries closely and made th
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compare favorably to 80 percent in
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ernment’s initiatives to overhaul
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vestment. 77 Yet by the end of 2005
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In reality, however, numerous limit
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defense and civilian research and i
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agement. This includes many key SOE
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China Academy of Engineering Physic
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a new Defense Industry Alliance was
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absorbed and combined with in-house
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China’s defense establishment org
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sets (mainly in CASC) such as with
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United States but failed. It then t
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vation that would result would inev
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will grow increasingly difficult an
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technology, large oil and gas field
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15. Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), at Pre
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the National Defense Industry’s
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People’s Liberation Army”), CMC
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es Entering the Defense Industry Se
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70. These two regulations have been
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82. Responsibilities of CSRC in off
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percent of defense corporation is u
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101. “Zhejiang Province Determine
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tutes, funded by the NRDC; and tech
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130. Denis Fred Simon and Cong Cao,
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146. Universities, for example, Tsi
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Enterprise China North Optical-Elec
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Industry Investment Fund: APPENDIX
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10. Zhao Bo, “武器装备应用
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of China (PRC) in late 1949, milita
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This chapter seeks to provide an ov
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sional journals, such as Logistics
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USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrie
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will examine China’s current logi
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tribution, health service support [
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force, such as food, water and ice,
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LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION GOALS AND
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3. Sustainment of Units Abroad, and
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Phase Three: • Under the joint le
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zone” (战区), while joint logis
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• All supporting facilities in th
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educed. Wary of the cost of militar
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user. As a result, these innovation
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As the link between the war front a
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tion distribution centers for close
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Date Mission Location Observers Tro
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than 50 kinds of 5 major categories
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ties, 118 while enhancing China’s
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acy missions in the Gulf of Aden, a
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• Decentralization versus central
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY Truth
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U.S. commitments to Taiwan. If Chin
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3. The Army has been the main force
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19. See, for example, Ngok Lee, Chi
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37. Joint core logistics capabiliti
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58. Wang Guanghui and Wang Youlin,
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78. Feng Yongmin, Zhang Lingling, a
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“A Study of the Strategy of Build
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115. Antonio Castillo, “China in
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• Three Generation (三代) refor
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ning, building, and using in a unif
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2005 • Hu Jintao asked military t
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2009 • Jan—Chinese missile-arme
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2. Hu Fuwen, “On Realizing the Pr
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30. Ren Pan and Ju Zhenhau, “’P
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Wang Jinghai (王京海) Zhao Zhanp
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Jin Xiuman (金秀满) Military Veh
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Chen Guoshu (陈国书) Li Guangren
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Li Wanjun (荔万俊) An Introducti
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Guo Qinmao (郭钦茂) Wang Benhong
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS DANIEL ALDER
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policy, and technology issues, has
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where she analyzed the frequency an
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SUSAN M. PUSKA, a retired U.S. Army
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macy, Foreign Policy and Defense St
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