The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

government and Party leaders tend to respond to petitioners
and demonstrators by suggesting that they
have been “manipulated by a small number of bad
people with ulterior motives” or are “enemies of the
people”—both ideological justifications for the use of
overwhelming coercive force. 56
Not all mass incidents require the use of coercive
force: many are resolved in such a way as to achieve a
“soft landing.” 57 There are, however, many instances
in which local governments have called upon the PAP
to handle mass incidents. The immediate causes of
these mass incidents are varied. Many concern grievances
generated when powerful industrial or real estate
developers, operating with the protection of local
government, seize land for development. 58 In addition
to disputes over land use, development, and resettlement,
other common causes of mass incidents include
anger over failed investment schemes, protests at environmental
damage caused by industry or mining,
and popular dissatisfaction with the authorities’ handling
of sensitive legal cases such as rape, homicide,
or unexplained death. 59
In 2008-09, four mass incidents in particular were
publicized as examples from which the PAP and (even
more so) local government could learn some valuable
lessons. These were, the Weng’an Incident in Guizhou
Province, the Menglian Incident in Yunnan Province,
the Longnan Incident in Gansu Province and
the Shishou Incident in Hubei. We will look briefly at
these four incidents, and then consider the lessons that
Chinese observers, the Chinese government and the
PAP have drawn both from these particular incidents
and from the handling of mass incidents in general.
Both the Menglian and Longnan incidents were
sparked by citizen concerns over land and property
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