The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

line. Similar to the Weng’an and Longnan incidents,
supporters and people with no vested interest in the
original dispute itself quickly transformed a confrontation
between local authorities and the family and
friends of the deceased into a violent riot involving
tens of thousands of people. According to one report,
10,000 armed police were deployed to bring the situation
under control. 64
We know that the handling of mass incidents is
one of the PAP’s tasks, and that PAP forces have been
involved in bringing some of the most serious and
highly publicized mass incidents under control. But
what, specifically, are the PAP’s tasks in that regard,
and what lessons might the PAP have derived from
its experiences? Unfortunately, openly published accounts
of mass incidents have little specific to say about
the precise roles played and techniques employed
by the PAP in restoring order. Photographs, videos,
and descriptions indicate the use of large squadrons
of armed police equipped with protective helmets
and riot shields advancing on (and sometimes being
driven back by) crowds of rioters and refer to and/
or show the use of water cannon, police batons, what
appear to be iron bars, and firearms. In the Shishou
incident, armed police are described as advancing in
waves, four rows of soldiers to a wave, retaking and
sealing off the city streets. 65
The reluctance to address PAP operations at any
level of concrete detail is accompanied by a general
lack of specific operational lessons to be learned from
the handling of mass incidents. Some authors writing
in professional journals suggest that lack of appropriate
equipment is a problem. 66 One, for example, argues
that armed police are sometimes reluctant to fire
the high-velocity military weapons (handguns, rifles,
256