The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

predictability in his interaction with Jiang before he
was confirmed as CMC chair in 2004. Primarily, he
has timed his execution of control over the PLA correctly.
For instance, Hu has been careful about what
he should not do prematurely. Although as part of
the succession plan he oversaw the PLA’s daily management
since the beginning of 2004, he inspected its
Western Hills Strategic Command Center only a few
days after he was confirmed as CMC chair. This means
that he avoided stepping into the areas of top operational
command (i.e., the nuclear button), which is
the institutional privilege of the CMC chair under the
CMC one-man command system. Following the principle
that key military power should not be divided,
all vice CMC chairs lead only under authorization of
the chair. 42 On major decisions, they are just top advisors
to the chair. Hu observed this tradition and strict
regulations carefully. 43 This is what Jiang’s emphasis
on “understand politics” (讲政治) was about.
However, as soon as Hu took the helm, he exercised
his institutional power without any hesitation.
He issued his strategic guidance for PLA development,
namely “three provides and one role”: provide
the CCP with a political guarantee for its hold on power,
provide the state with the security guarantee for
its governance, and provide the nation with military
capabilities to protect its best interests. The key role
is to maintain world peace and regional stability. 44 He
wields his power of troop deployment and personnel
appointment with determination. For instance, the
troop deployment for the Wenchuan rescue was strictly
under his authorization, normally through General
Cao Gangchuan (曹刚川) rather than Wen Jiabao (温
家宝). 45 One of the reasons for Hu to cut short his trip
to Italy for the G-8 meeting in July was that he had to
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