The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

sible solution to an unexpected but tangible challenge
to its sovereignty, security, and commerce. 22 “Piracy
has become a serious threat to shipping, trade, and
safety on the seas,” Foreign Ministry spokesman
Liu Jianchao explained. “That’s why we decided to
send naval ships to crack down.” 23 This was part of
a carefully-orchestrated campaign. Various Chinese
strategists floated “trial balloons” in the news media
in mid-December, giving the government a chance to
gauge possible international reactions. 24 As part of a
larger effort to increase foreign perceptions of Chinese
transparency, the Ministry of National Defense
Information Office (MNDIO), conceived in late 2007
and active from January 8, 2008, plays new role both
at home and abroad in interfacing with the outside
world and consolidating public consensus. 25
On December 17, 2008, MNDIO office director and
chief spokesman Senior Colonel Hu Changming told
the Financial Times that “China would likely deploy
warships to the Gulf of Aden.” On December 20, he
stated officially that three vessels would depart in a
week’s time. Then, on December 23, Senior Colonel
Huang Xueping, MND Secondary Spokesman and
MNDIO Deputy Director, convened a news conference
at MNDIO’s News Release Office. 26 There he
and two other PLA representatives stressed that the
primary goal of the mission—to safeguard Chinese
shipping—represented neither a shift in noninterventionist
foreign policy nor a commitment to further
blue-water operations. In the words of the director of
the Operations Department at PLAN Headquarters,
China wants to protect “ships of international organizations
[such as the UN World Food Program] that
are carrying humanitarian supplies to Somalia.” 27 This
allows China to shift from being the only permanent
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