The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

absorbed and combined with in-house R&D activities.
125 This is difficult to assess for lack of evidence,
and despite a number of notable examples, their affect
on defense innovation appears to be limited. China
may also acquire sensitive technologies through its
global interactions within the S&T related enterprises,
however that also appears to be limited. 126 China has
also imported RBM 35 billion in high-tech imports, 85
percent of which were in CMI relevant fields including
electronics, computers, telecommunications, and
opto-electronics. 127 Moreover, in terms of indices measuring
domestic S&T progress, China currently ranks
near the top in R&D spending per GDP, and published
papers and output of S&T graduates. 128 The spillover
to the defense industry is almost certainly substantial.
Reportedly, one-third of 40,000 top graduates from
seven of COSTIND-affiliated universities go to the defense
industry. 129
While considerable progress in a number of areas
has been made, China’s broader prospects for indigenous
innovation or leapfrog in key scientific areas
(and their diffusion to the defense industry) remain
uncertain due inherent weaknesses in China’s S&T
workforce and infrastructure. 130 A primary issue is
the degree of focus on original R&D activity and
enterprise-centered innovation. According to current
statistics, enterprises account for 70 percent of R&D
spending. 131 Yet, few companies have the financial resources
to carry out innovative R&D. 132 This problem
is exemplified by the state of China’s high-tech parks,
where firms spent 1.9 percent of their sales on R&D,
far below the 5 percent minimum standard. R&D
expenditure is even lower outside high-tech parks.
Overall, China’s high-tech parks have largely served
as distributions, procession, and trading centers for
511