The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
1. Existing literature on this subject falls into several categories.
For PLAN development, see 张世平 (Zhang Shiping), “中国
海权“ (“China Sea Power”), Beijing, China: 人民日报出版社 (People’s
Daily Press), 2009; Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval
Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to
‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 144-169.
For piracy, see Martin Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty
Money, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. For naval
operations in the Gulf of Aden, see Gary J. Ohls, Somalia . . . From
the Sea, Naval War College Newport Paper, No. 34, 2009.
2. See Bernard D. Cole, Ph.D., Testimony before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Military
and Security Activities Abroad,” March 4, 2009, p. 4.
3. Guo Gang, “Escort by Military Vessels: Chinese Naval Escort
Formation Gathered Representatives of Escorted Merchant
Ships Together to Exchange Views on and Discuss Escort Safety,”
Xinhua, October 26, 2009, OSC CPP20091026354006.
4. At an expanded CMC conference on December 24, 2004,
Chairman Hu introduced a new military policy that defined
the four new missions of the PLA: first, to serve as an “important
source of strength” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
to “consolidate its ruling position”; second, to “provide a solid
security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic
opportunity for national development”; third, to “provide a
strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests”; and
fourth, to “play an important role in maintaining world peace
and promoting common development.” See “Earnestly Step up
Ability Building within CPC Organizations of Armed Forces,”
解放军报 (Liberation Army Daily), December 13, 2004, available
from www.chinamil.com.cn; “三个提供, 一个发挥“ (“Three Provides
and One Bring Into Play”), available from news.sina.com.
cn. The second mission entails continued military modernization
to enhance the credibility of deterrence against threats on
China’s periphery (e.g., the possibility of Taiwan independence).
The resulting strategic stability ensures a peaceful external environment
for economic development, globalization and integration
of China into the global economy at a time when China can
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