The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

The Chunxiao gas field dispute emerges from this
disagreement. Beijing argues that the Chunxiao gas
field is five km west of even Japan’s claimed EEZ, so
it must be in the Chinese EEZ. Tokyo argues that the
Chunxiao gas field and other related East China Sea
gas fields extend to the east of the median line into
its EEZ; therefore Japan is entitled to a share of the
Chunxiao field’s resources. Four years of negotiations
led to a June 2008 agreement providing for a 2,700 km
joint development zone (JDZ) that essentially bisects
the median line used by Japan to establish its East
China Sea EEZ. Joint exploration of this zone is to be
conducted on the principle of “mutual benefit.” As
of November 2009, however, there has been no progress
in either the conclusion of the treaty that would
formalize the agreement or Japanese participation in
exploiting the Chunxiao gas field. 57
Despite the significantly improved relations between
Tokyo and Beijing, including military relations
to be discussed below, as with the South China Sea
disputes it is highly unlikely that Japan and China will
resolve the issues dividing them any time soon. What
does seem evident is that China’s naval programs are
designed in part to ensure that Beijing’s ability to defend
its maritime interests in both the South and East
China Seas is clearly recognized.
Maritime Asia: The United States.
While South and Central Asia present China and
the PLA with long-term strategic concerns they cannot
ignore, it is in maritime Asia they confront their most
serious apprehensions. Here the primary concern
is not the maritime territorial and resource disputes
China has with various competing claims in the East
78