The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

y a strategic question of whether Ma’s Strait vision
converges with Lee Teng-hui’s. 85
So far Beijing has elected not to employ such an
interpretation, wisely and correctly. To maintain the
momentum of anti-independence and opportunities
created by Taipei’s rhetorical adherence to the 1992
accord, a maximum level of ambiguity has been exercised
as a strategy to guide Beijing’s response to the
Ma Ying-jeou dilemma. The question is whether Hu
can sustain this top consensus, which is by no means
firm, as ambiguity is a hotbed for controversies by itself.
This is especially true when Ma continues to raise
controversial issues, such as the Dalai’s Taiwan visit
in August, which forced Hu to make the tough decision
to retaliate or to “swallow it.” 86 Not all leaders see
Beijing’s strategic gains from Ma’s claim on nonindependence
to have exceeded its tactical concessions.
So far, the PLA shows no sign of disagreement
with Hu’s employment of an olive branch toward Taiwan,
although its rank and file members question the
wisdom of softening pressure too quickly. 87 The CMC
has actually supported Hu’s call for building mutual
military and security trust with Taiwan in his 6-point
declaration. It has refrained from commenting on the
provocations from Taipei, such as Ma’s 6-points in
March 2008 which started with a personal attack on
Wen Jiabao, threatened to boycott the Beijing Olympic
Games, and supported the Dalai Lama and Chinese
dissidents. Certainly, there is the occasional use of
tough language over some issues, such as criticism of
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. 88 Major General Luo Yuan
(罗援) has been the only senior official to criticize Ma
by name over his approval of the Dalai Lama’s visit
to Taiwan. 89 On the other hand, the PLA consistently
backs Hu’s Taiwan policy that expresses Party support
176