The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

41. “海军党委扩大会议召开” (“The Enlarged PLA Navy Party
Committee in Session”), 人民海军报 (The PLAN Newspaper),
March 23, 2006, p. 1.
42. The PLA Daily, September 26, 2004.
43. Here is a telling example of this tough regulation. In 1969
Lin Biao summoned General Chen Shique, commander of PLA
Engineering Corps, to brief him about nuclear construction projects.
When Chen got to know that Mao did not know about this
meeting, he became extremely nervous. After a few sleepless
nights, he reported this to Mao and got Mao’s praise. Chen Renkang
(陈任康), 一生追随毛泽东 (Following Mao Zedong for the whole
of his life), Beijing, China: Renmin Chubanshe, 2005. This tradition
holds ground to this day. It is politically dangerous for any senior
PLA commanders to intrude into commanding areas other than
their own.
44. On the “three-provide and one-guarantee,” see Lieutenant
General Liu Jixian (刘继贤), “学习贯彻胡锦涛军队政治工作思想的
认识” (“Understanding Hu Jintao’s thinking on the political work
of the PLA, Part Two”), 中国军队政治工作 (Political Work in Chinese
Military), No. 11, 2008, p. 7; and Xinhua, September 20, 2005.
45. I have read hundreds of articles written by PLA Officers
about PLA Wenchuan operations. The standard language is
“troops are deployed and activities are implemented under the
leadership of the CC, the CMC, and Chairman Hu.” Virtually no
mention was made to Wen Jiabao and the State Council’s Wenchuan
Rescue Headquarters. Soldiers were unhappy at Wen’s unnecessary
reprimand to the PLA Air Force for its failure to parachute
in Beichuan due to bad weather. Clearly, in their minds it
was Hu, rather than anyone else, that they should unconditionally
obey. See Lieutenant General Wu Cangde (吴唱德) , director
general of the Political Affairs Department of the Chengdu Military
Region, “从抗震救灾看非战争军事行动中的政治思想工作”
(“Political work in military operations short of war in earthquake
relief”), 中国军队政治工作 (Political Work in Chinese Military), No.
8, 2008, pp. 11-14.
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