The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

with New Delhi in 2006 committing the two countries’
military institutions to a program of combined
exercises; an annual defense dialogue between the
two defense establishments; and collaboration in antipiracy
and counterterrorism operations, search-and
rescue exercises, and recurring military exchanges. 41
This MOU built on an already expanding pattern of
Sino-Indian military contacts. 42 The two navies had
conducted their first combined exercise off Shanghai
in November 2003—a search and rescue exercise. This
was followed by another search and rescue exercise
in the Arabian Sea off the Malabar coast in 2005, and
Chinese observers were invited to the Indian Army’s
exercises that year. At China’s invitation, India sent
observers to the SCO’s combined exercise “Peace Mission
2005,” where Russian and Chinese units formed
the largest contingents. 2007 saw yet another Sino-
Indian combined naval exercise off Qingdao. Following
the MOU, the first Sino-Indian defense dialogue
was held in Beijing in November 2007, and their first
ground force combined exercise, “Hand-in-Hand
2007,” was held in Yunnan Province during December.
Combined exercises and dialogue between senior
military officers continue. These exercises parallel India’s
exercises with U.S. forces, suggesting that New
Delhi has crafted a course of military diplomacy designed
to enhance India’s gains without offending either
China or the United States.
It seems evident that both China and India see their
mutual suspicions and potential strategic competition
as best managed by close military and political ties.
As New Delhi and Beijing know full well, military
confrontation would serve neither country’s interests.
Close military and political linkages that encourage
frequent dialogue allows both to keep a finger on the
70