The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

guarded the Chinese merchant ship Zhenhua 25.” 76 A
further helicopter deterrent mission on November 12
also succeeded, even though pirates had already fired
and attempted to board COSCO vessel Fuqiang, injuring
two of its crew in the process. 77
THE DEXINHAI INCIDENT: LOGICAL RESULT,
OR EVIDENCE OF ONGOING LIMITATIONS?
A dramatic incident has called into question the
extent to which Beijing can, and will, use naval means
to safeguard civilian ships. Dexinhai, a Chineseflagged
bulk carrier which had failed to register according
to Chinese procedures, was pirated 700 NM
east of Somalia on October 19, 2009. Early rumors that
Zhoushan and Xuzhou were steaming to its rescue 78
gave way to reports that as of November, Dexinhai
and its 25 crew members were trapped in the pirate
stronghold of Hobyo on the central Somali coast. Liang
Wei, South Sea Fleet deputy chief of operations,
reportedly explained that Zhoushan and Xuzhou had
been too far away (over 1,000 nautical miles, according
to another source) 79 to reach the pirates during the
3 days they piloted Dexinhai to shore. Apparently, the
PLAN did convene an emergency meeting on October
21. 80 Fudan University professor Zhang Jiadong
predicted that because the priority is to save lives, not
fight pirates, China would establish communications
with Somali government and warlords; approach the
site with naval ships for deterrence and control; and
pay the pirates to release the hostages. 81
China’s official press seemed to convey a sense of
relief when Dexinhai entered Somalia’s territorial waters
because it provided a rationale for inaction. While
UNSCR 1846 and 1851 authorize operations within So-
313