The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

ear command team directed Zhenhua 4 to engage in
self-defense, then secured the assistance of Malaysian
warships via the International Maritime Bureau’s antipiracy
center. 110 However, there has also been concern
that unsecure communication via maritime satellite
in the past meant that “secrets were divulged in PLA
exercises”; subsequent use of the Beidou navigation
satellite system’s “short messaging” and “time service
and position locating functions” has “solved the problem
of secrets being divulged in communication to a
certain extent.” 111
Now, apparently for the first time, China is relying
on its own capabilities from start to finish. From the
first counterpiracy deployment, PLAN Control Center
(海军指挥中心) and MoT’s China Search and Rescue
Center (中国海上搜救中心) track all relevant Chinese
merchant ships, on which the MoT has installed devices
to support a maritime satellite-based ship movement
tracking system (船舶动态跟踪系统). Supported
by freshly developed software, this permits “all-dimensional
tracking (全方位跟踪)” and video-based
communications “at all times.” 112 Here Beijing’s ability
to locate PRC-flagged vessels clearly benefits from
the China Ship Reporting (CHISREP) System, which
requires “all Chinese-registered ships over 300 GT engaged
in international routes” to report position daily
to the PRC Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration.
113 At least one drill has been conducted, and MoT
is confident that “sufficient preparations have been
made.” 114 Rear Admiral Yang Yi was paraphrased as
saying that communications between ships of different
nations should not be difficult: “Surface ships are
visible and usually tracked to avoid collisions. They
are sometimes monitored by both satellite and surveillance
aircraft.” 115
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