The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

How the United States responds to improvements
in China’s military capabilities beyond its shores, in
general, will be influenced to a large degree by China
itself. U.S. military logistics cooperation with China,
which has been significantly constrained for most of
the last 20 years since the Tiananmen Square incident,
could provide an area for development of cooperation
and mutual reassurance of intentions.
Continuing a de facto embargo of professional military
logistics contacts serves special interests group
in both China and the United States who benefit more
from a mutual threat perception, than they do from
effort to enhance cooperation, transparency, and trust.
Although we can expect the U.S. to continue to constrain
military logistics contacts due to a perception
that operational contacts in logistics mean potential
“assistance” to the growth of China’s military capabilities,
it may be time to rethink the role and purpose
of U.S. military contacts with China for two reasons.
First, continuing no contact in military logistics
inhibits the development of U.S.-China military contacts,
which may not best serve national interests to
maintain stability, particularly as China’s military
becomes more capable and confident. Second, these
restrictions do not enhance the U.S. military’s understanding
of China’s growing operational capabilities,
while they have had limited to no effect on the pace,
scope, and rate of improvement to China’s military logistics
system.
The United States would be ill advised to make
unilateral overtures to China for new bilateral contacts
in logistics as well as other areas, until China can take
ownership of its own role in promoting substantive
military-to-military contacts with the United States,
rather than hold them hostage to past grievances and
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