The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

world peace.” 177 Specifically, Dai argues that support
facilities are required not only to protect China’s
growing global economic interests, but also to enable
PLA participation in peacekeeping missions, ship escort
deployments, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief operations. 178 Moreover, Dai argues
that overseas bases or support facilities are required
if China is to “effectively shoulder its international responsibilities
and develop a good image.” Perhaps anticipating
the possibility that setting up overseas bases
would heighten international concerns about China’s
growing power, however, Dai states that Chinese bases
would not be part of a global military competition
and “would not require long-term stationing of large
military equipment or large-scale military units.” Furthermore,
Dai suggests that a strategic communications
campaign would help to alleviate concerns about
China’s intentions. 179 As a first step, Dai advocates the
establishment of a prototypical “test” base in the strategically
vital South China Sea, 180 presumably in addition
to existing facilities at Woody Island and Mischief
Reef. Future bases should then be established in other
areas where China has important strategic interests;
when possible, bases should be located in countries
with which China already has what Dai—perhaps
somewhat optimistically—characterizes as “friendly,
solid relationships.”
While there are indications of growing Chinese
influence in the South Pacific for commercial and perhaps
even signals intercept purposes, 181 it is the Indian
Ocean with its rich littoral resources 182 and busy energy
SLOCs that seems the most likely future area of
Chinese naval power projection. A range of Chinese
analyses state that from ancient times through the
Cold War, the Indian Ocean has been a critical theater
338