The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

command state that half an hour after the earthquake,
they had contacted seven prefectural and city military
commands and ordered each city or prefecture to organize
500-man disaster relief battalions from their
militia forces, equip them with transportation and engineering
equipment, and get them on the way into
areas affected by the earthquake. Three hours after the
quake hit, after they had gained a clearer understanding
of the situation, they ordered reserve divisions,
brigades, and regiments to gather their forces and
head for the affected areas. These reserves, following
on the militia, made up a second wave of response to
the disaster. The Sichuan Military District (MD) leaders
attributed their rapid response to their having had
in place a dual-use (war and emergency response) defense
mobilization plan that involved the MD leadership
and the provincial, prefectural, and county-level
governments. 33 Other authors, too, pointed to the utility
of existing national defense mobilization plans and
to successes in transferring troops and equipment to
the earthquake zone. 34
In addition to the speed of response, another area
of much-publicized positive lesson had to do with
air power. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) played roles including aerial monitoring
and reconnaissance, airborne insertion of troops and
supplies, and communications (the use of the Beidou
satellite positioning system, for example). 35 Much was
made of the exploits of 15 soldiers who parachuted
into a remote village cut off from the outside world
under difficult conditions. Advocates of army aviation
also made a very strong case for the utility of helicopters
(and the need to purchase more helicopters) as
one of the lessons of the disaster relief effort. 36
While there was much to celebrate about the
earthquake relief effort, commentators also pointed
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