The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

Terrorist threats remain real, although not strategic
by nature. For a long time to come, the PLA’s overall
deployment guidance of defensive defense in the
north and defensive offense in the south (北守南攻)
will not change. 77 This entails the strategic guidance of
the 1.5 war scenario: waging an offensive war against
Taiwan independence and a defensive counterattack
along land borders due to the “chain reaction of a Taiwan
war by China’s hostile land neighbors.” 78 Yet the
defensive posture in the northwest and the southwest
can now be better taken care of with strengthened redeployment
against India’s stationing of 60,000 more
soldiers in the Zangnan region (藏南地区), North Korea’s
increased hostility toward China, and clashes
along sections of the Sino-Burma border. 79 This continental
defense has been comparatively less emphasized
up to now in order to put limited resources along
the eastern flank. Now, if the CMC wants to adjust the
force strength in the two directions, decombatification
in the Taiwan Strait may offer an unprecedented opportunity.
For instance, when the missiles deployed
across the Strait are reduced in number, they can be
moved elsewhere to counter new threats. 80
Civilian-Military Responses to the New Taiwan
Situation.
The strategic gains for the PLA, mentioned above,
in the new Taiwan situation provide the foundation
for PLA support to Hu’s efforts to fine-tune the twopronged
Taiwan policy. Concretely, this means Beijing’s
constant concessions to Ma in order to boost his
chances to win the second term and in return prolong
China’s strategic opportunity period. Yet this is easier
said than done. The major source of tension lies in
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