The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

ings on future wars depict a more prominent role for
the other services.
From the previous observations one can say that
the PLA’s efforts in informationization transformation
have largely failed. But these yardsticks may be too
high. According to China’s 2008 Defense White Paper,
the PLA has the goal of laying a foundation for informationization
by 2010, to make major progress by
2020, and to mostly reach the goal of informationization
by 2050. By this measure, it appears that the PLA
is meeting its own standards for joint reform.
Pollpeter also observes that the PLA is aware of the
fact that informationization is a double-edged sword.
It creates vulnerability for the PLA. Yet the PLA commitment
to this transformation is undiminished. It
will press on, much like the Chinese old saying of 明知
山有虎, 偏向虎山行 (going undeterred by the dangers
ahead). That said, it appears that the PLA possessing
sophisticated C4ISR is only a matter of time. With this
capability, the PLA will become a true global military
power and pose a serious challenge to the United
States.
In Chapter 6, Harold M. Tanner looks at the PLA’s
recent MOOTW experience. Tanner points out that the
PLA has not seen combat since its brief “punitive war”
against Vietnam in 1979. In the 30 years since, and particularly
since the mid-1990s, the PLA has undergone
substantial modernization, reorganization, and training;
but while they have been trained and equipped
for war, China’s soldiers have been deployed time and
again not to fight external enemies, but to respond to
internal security issues such as natural disasters, violent
mass demonstrations or “mass incidents,” and
episodes of ethnic unrest.
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