The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

PLA NEAR-TERM CONCERNS
With cross-Strait tensions eased by the policies pursued
by Ma Ying-jeou following his election to Taiwan’s
presidency, Beijing’s concern over the outbreak
of a cross-Strait military confrontation has declined.
Hu Jintao’s speech marking the 30th anniversary of
Jiang Zemin’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”
reflected this reduced concern by raising the need
for cross-Strait confidence-building measures (CBM).
Point VI of his text stressed that there was a need to
“mitigate military security apprehensions” and that
“in due course” the two sides should explore how to
create “a mechanism of mutual trust for military security.”
18 In May 2009, Yang Yi, spokesperson for the
Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of China’s State Council
repeated this recommendation stating that in “good
time” the two sides can conduct military exchanges
and explore ways to construct a “mechanism of mutual
trust.” 19 This is not to suggest the PLA no longer
prepares for a possible military confrontation over
Taiwan with potential, if not probable, U.S. military
intervention. It does suggest, however, that a cross-
Strait war is not a near-term concern. This is particularly
so when the political and economic relations between
Taiwan and China are quickly expanding.
The Korean Peninsula.
Of more immediate concern to the PLA is the tense
situation on the Korean peninsula. It is evident Beijing
found the political and security consequences of
DPRK’s satellite launch in April 2009 and the second
nuclear test in May extremely unsettling. In response
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