The PLA at Home and Abroad - Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army

to PLA transformation centered on a Taiwan war or
other conflict. Second, the Party’s preferential budgetary
treatment to the PLA will remain persistent; and
third, PLA autonomy will be guaranteed, especially in
the areas of operational planning, engagement codes,
and troop deployment. It can be well anticipated that
there will be a high level accord between the CCP and
the PLA on the three conditions. So far the level of
mutual support is high.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In summary, the changes and continuities of China’s
civil-military relations can be analyzed through
the dialectical interaction between the PLA’s old
guard traditions and its new historical missions. The
former informs the PLA’s continued subordination to
the Party. The latter refers to PLA transformation being
driven by its preparation for war, which consolidates
PLA professionalization.
Policymakers should first recognize that the
emerging trend of PLA noninterventionism is the
outcome of a CCP/PLA consensus that the military
entering the Party’s internal politics harms the longterm
prospects for Party leadership, but this does not
contradict the PLA’s willingness to protect the CCP’s
maintenance of leadership over China. Therefore, the
implication of this arrangement is that it continues to
give the PLA a key role in the country’s political process.
For instance, the PLA was not in a position to
press for its choice in China’s recent succession process,
but in 2002, it helped Jiang retain his title as CMC
chair. This shows that the institutionalization that has
taken place to date is still reversible. 90 But policymakers
should also note that such intrusive behaviour is
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